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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT
Matthew Paul Taylor
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Economics
June 2012
Title: Risk Aversion and Information Acquisition Across Real and Hypothetical
Settings
I collect data on subjects’ information acquisition during real and hypothetical
risky choices using process-tracing software called Mouselab. I also measure subjects’
cognitive ability using the cognitive reflective test (CRT). On average, measured risk
preferences are not significantly different across real and hypothetical settings. However,
cognitive ability is inversely related to risk aversion when choices are hypothetical,
but it is unrelated when the choices are real. This interaction between cognitive
ability and hypothetical setting is consistent with the notion that some individuals,
specifically higher-ability individuals, treat hypothetical choices as “puzzles” and may
help explain why some studies find that subjects indicate that they are more tolerant
of risk when they make hypothetical choices than when they make real choices. On
average, subjects demonstrate a similar degree of consistency across settings, and
there are also no significant differences across settings in the amount of time subjects
take to make a choice, the amount of information they acquire, or how they distribute
their attention.
I also find evidence to suggest that subjects acquire information in a manner
consistent with the implicit calculation of expected utility. Specifically, individuals do
not merely make choices “as if” they are integrating probabilities and outcomes, it
iv
appears that they actually are. Moreover, as they progress through a series of choices
in a commonly used risk preference elicitation method, their information acquisition
becomes progressively more consistent with integration models. Finally, on average,
individuals appear to acquire information in real and hypothetical settings in similar
ways.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Understanding risk preferences is important to economists because many, if
not most, economic decisions that individuals make are made in the context of
uncertainty. If individuals are risk averse, which research suggests that most people
are, appropriately measuring the impact of policy on welfare requires reliable estimates
of risk preferences.
While there is general agreement that individuals are risk averse, the degree and
nature of that risk aversion, as well as how risk aversion varies across individuals and
in different contexts, remain questions of intense interest. However, to address these
questions often requires that economists use data consisting of hypothetical choices
by research subjects. Consider the issue of climate change. Many of the benefits of
climate change mitigation are inherently non-market goods (e.g., reduced severity
of extreme weather events, prevention of sea level rise). Further complicating the
measurement of climate change preferences is the fact that actual benefits may occur
far in the future. Thus, estimating the benefits of climate change mitigation generally
requires the use of hypothetical choices in artificial scenarios.
There is some evidence to suggest, however, that individuals tend to choose
in ways that suggest they are more tolerant of risk when faced with hypothetical
choices than when they face comparable real choices. There is not a strong economic
justification for why an individual would misrepresent his preferences though, given
that the purely hypothetical choices have no economic consequences if they are not
being interpreted as an advisory referendum.
This dissertation goes beyond the typical comparison of average risk attitudes
across real and hypothetical settings. I use process-tracing software to observe how
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individuals acquire information about risky choices in both real and hypothetical
settings. I also measure cognitive ability and estimate richer models that incorporate
into the choice models a number of interactions between individual characteristics
(i.e., cognitive ability and information acquisition) and the treatment consisting of
real versus hypothetical settings. In addition, I examine whether individuals acquire
information about the choices in a manner that is more consistent with expected
utility theory or with the application of a simplifying choice heuristic, and whether
this choice behavior differs across real and hypothetical settings.
Chapter II tests for differences in average risk aversion, choice consistency, and
information acquisition across real and hypothetical settings. I do not find differences
in average risk aversion across real or hypothetical settings, nor do I find evidence
of “hypothetical bias” in a within-subject comparison. Also, there is no evidence to
indicate that the consistency of subjects’ choices depends on the presence of incentives.
Notably, information acquisition is remarkably similar across settings. If individuals
devoted less consideration to hypothetical choices than to real choices, then it is
reasonable to think that they would spend less time and acquire less or different
information. However, the evidence does not support this hypothesis.
Chapter III explores whether individuals tend to acquire information in sequences
that are consistent with expected utility theory (and prospect theory) or with the
application of a heuristic. There is virtually no evidence to suggest that subjects were
using heuristics in the context of this experiment. Furthermore, there is some evidence
that subjects optimized their information acquisition process as they progressed
through the choices in a manner consistent with someone integrating probabilities
and payoffs. These results are important because they were found in the context of a
commonly-used risk preference elicitation method. Thus, they suggest that attempts
to estimate risk preferences using this method are in fact doing just that.
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Chapter IV incorporates individual heterogeneity into a choice model that
estimates risk preferences. Significantly, the results suggest that individuals with
higher cognitive ability tend to indicate that they are more tolerant of risk when
they make hypothetical choices than when they make real choices. This finding is
consistent with previous studies that suggest individuals may “construct” answers to
hypothetical choices. Specifically, it indicates that high-ability individuals construct
answers to hypothetical choices. In the context of an experiment that elicits risk
preferences, it is plausible that high-ability individuals would attempt to “solve” the
hypothetical choices and respond in accordance with the notion of risk neutrality.
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CHAPTER II
RISK AVERSION AND INFORMATION ACQUISITION ACROSS REAL AND
HYPOTHETICAL SETTINGS
Risk preferences are fundamental to decision making under risk. To evaluate the
welfare impacts of policies with uncertain outcomes, we need reliable evidence about
risk preferences. Frequently, however, it is problematic to use data from real choices
to estimate risk preferences or to replicate in a laboratory setting the real economic
choices in which we are interested. For example, environmental economists and others
who consider policies involving public goods or externalities face this problem when
studying risk attitudes about choices concerning fundamentally non-market goods.
As a consequence, it is common for environmental economists to resort to the use
of hypothetical choice scenarios to estimate preferences over specified alternatives.
Hypothetical choice scenarios have also been used extensively in market research,
transportation research, and health economics. In all of these areas, researches must
regularly contend with non-market goods, including pre-test market products and
public goods.
Laboratory experiments can be a valuable means to elicit preference information
because they allow exogenous manipulation of the variables of interest (Falk and
Heckman, 2009). However, the use of hypothetical scenarios is common in the
laboratory setting as well because it is often prohibitively costly, impractical, or
impossible to explore risk attitudes about real choices involving large stakes, such as
the decision to buy a home or which medical treatment to choose. In other cases, even
when the stakes are relatively small and it is possible to design experiments with real
consequences, the use of real payoffs is simply impractical. For example, one recent
study used hypothetical payoffs to estimate risk preferences in Afghanistan because it
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was considered too dangerous to carry around the relatively large amount of currency
necessary to complete the experiment with real payoffs.1
There is some evidence, however, to suggest that individuals may respond
differently to hypothetical choices involving risk than they do in similar real-choice
contexts. In an influential experiment designed to evaluate objections to laboratory-
based estimates of risk aversion, Holt and Laury (2002) demonstrate that individuals
tend to make choices that imply that they are more tolerant of risk in a hypothetical
setting than in a real setting. The Holt and Laury study also finds that this
“hypothetical bias” worsens as the size of the stakes increases. Several other studies,
including Holt and Laury (2005), also find evidence of hypothetical bias in risk
preferences (Battalio et al., 1990; Harrison, 2006).
However, some studies find no significant difference in risk attitudes across
hypothetical and real contexts (see for example Beattie and Loomes (1997); Camerer
(1995); Camerer and Hogarth (1999), and Kuhberger et al. (2002)). Moreover, the
question of why individuals would tend to be more tolerant of risk in hypothetical
settings, rather than less tolerant, has yet to be explained. After all, the decisions
people make in such purely hypothetical settings are inconsequential in monetary
terms, and the stylized choices often have no externalities or potential influence on
policy. Thus, hypothetical bias does not appear to have an economic justification.2
More recently, Kang et al. (2011) used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
to show that common areas of the brain are activated when individuals make real
1Charles Sprenger presented preliminary results of his study at the 2011 North American Economic
Science Association Conference held in Tucson, Arizona in November 2011.
2Murphy and Stevens (2004) discuss the lack of theoretical reasoning for hypothetical bias with
respect to willingness-to-pay elicitation, but the same argument applies to risk preference elicitation.
Carson and Groves (2007) consider the incentive properties of “inconsequential” survey questions in
the context of valuation studies, but their conclusion that “economic theory makes no predictions”
about respondent behavior is equally relevant here.
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and hypothetical choices about the purchase of consumer goods, but they note that
the intensity of this activity differs. These divergent experimental findings about
hypothetical bias, along with the lack of a rigorous theoretical explanation, suggests
the question of risk preferences across real and hypothetical contexts merits further
study.
No other study has examined whether information acquisition behavior differs
across real and hypothetical settings when subjects make choices between risky options.
Wilcox (1993) explores whether subjects spend different amounts of time on decisions
when there is variability in the fraction of subjects who will be paid. This mechanism,
known as the random lottery mechanism (RLM), adds additional uncertainty to the
experiment from the perspective of the subject because only some subjects will be
selected at random to be paid based on their decisions.3 Wilcox finds that subjects
spend more time on higher-yielding decisions, where “higher-yielding” implies a greater
probability that the subject will be selected to have at least one of her choices have
real consequences. I am concerned with more than just time spent considering a
decision, however. I am interested in what types of information subjects acquire and
how much information they collect before making a decision.
A between-subjects comparison of average risk preferences reveals no evidence of
hypothetical bias in average risk preferences in my sample. As in most studies that
elicit risk preferences, however, subjects are risk averse on average. I also find that
females are more risk averse than males, which is consistent with previous findings as
well.
The evidence here does not support the notion that the inconsistency of subjects’
choices increases in the hypothetical setting relative to the real setting. In fact,
3The uncertainty introduced by the RLM is separate from the uncertainty created by the random
selection procedure (RSP), which specifies that only a subset of a subject’s decisions will determine a
subject’s payoff.
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individuals are surprisingly consistent given the complexity of the tasks they were
asked to complete. Choice consistency does appear to be related to information
acquisition behavior in expected ways: less-complete information sets are related to
less-consistent choices.
Finally, individuals’ information acquisition behavior is quite similar across real
and hypothetical settings. Subjects do not choose to acquire less information about
hypothetical choices than real choices, nor do they devote less time to their hypothetical
choices. Additionally, there is no strong evidence to suggest that subjects distribute
their attention differently across settings. There is a slight tendency for subjects to
allocate more attention to payoffs than to probabilities in the hypothetical setting,
but not to a statistically different degree.
Experimental Design
Eliciting Risk Preferences
To measure individual risk attitudes, I use a version of the Multiple Price List
(MPL) format pioneered by Holt and Laury (2002), and utilized by Harrison et al.
(2005, 2007) and Holt and Laury (2005). The MPL format presents ten pairs of
gambles, or lotteries, and asks the subject to choose the more-preferred gamble in
each pair. Columns (1) through (4) of Table 1 illustrates the conventionally ordered
MPL format. The payoffs of the gambles are structured so that Gamble B is more
risky than Gamble A because the differences in its payoffs are larger. In the example
shown in the table, Gamble A has possible payoffs of $40 and $32 and Gamble B has
higher-variance payoffs of $77 and $2. The probabilities are adjusted progressively
down the list of decisions so that the difference in the expected value between Gamble
A and Gamble B, calculated in columns (5) through (7) but not shown to the subject,
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is monotonically decreasing. A risk-neutral subject choosing solely on the basis of
expected value would select the safe gamble in the first four decisions and the risky
gamble in the last six decisions.
In Table 1, the rows are labeled by their Holt and Laury (HL) decision number.
Depending on the decision number at which a subject switches from the safe gamble
to the risky gamble, bounds for a preference parameter that measures risk attitudes
can be calculated directly from these choices. Column 8 in Table 1 contains the
bounds for the risk aversion parameter if we assume that utility is described by the
commonly used constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function, u(w) = w(1−r)(1−r) .
Expositionally, the implied CRRA intervals are associated with the first risky choice
that a subject chooses. For example, if a subject were to choose the safe gamble for the
first five decisions and then choose the risky gamble for the remaining five decisions,
then the lower bound of r can be computed by solving for r such that the subject is
indifferent between the gambles in HL Decision 5:
0.5(40
1−r
1− r ) + 0.5(
321−r
1− r ) = 0.5(
771−r
1− r ) + 0.5(
21−r
1− r )⇒ r = 0.15 (2.1)
Similarly, the upper bound of r can by determined by solving for r such that the
subject is indifferent between the gambles in HL Decision 6:
0.6(40
1−r
1− r ) + 0.4(
321−r
1− r ) = 0.6(
771−r
1− r ) + 0.4(
21−r
1− r )⇒ r = 0.41 (2.2)
Thus, a subject who makes his first risky choice on HL Decision 6 has a risk
aversion parameter between 0.15 and 0.41.
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TABLE 1. Multiple Price List
HL (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Decision Gamble A Gamble B
number p($40) p($32) p($77) p($2) EV A EV B EV A − EV B CRRA interval
1 0.1 0.9 0.1 0.9 32.80 9.50 23.30 r < −1.71
2 0.2 0.8 0.2 0.9 33.60 17.00 16.60 −1.71 < r < −0.95
3 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.7 34.40 24.80 9.90 −0.95 < r < −0.49
4 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 35.20 32.00 3.20 −0.49 < r < −0.15
5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 36.00 39.50 -3.50 −0.15 < r < 0.15
6 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.4 36.80 47.00 -10.20 0.15 < r < 0.41
7 0.7 0.3 0.7 0.3 37.60 54.50 -16.90 0.41 < r < 0.68
8 0.8 0.2 0.8 0.2 38.40 62.00 -21.60 0.68 < r < 0.97
9 0.9 0.1 0.9 0.1 39.20 69.50 -30.30 0.97 < r < 1.37
10 1 0 1 0 40.00 77.00 -37.00 1.37 < r
Notes: All currency units are in 2011 U.S. dollars. Subjects were not presented with the information in
columns (5) through (8). The probabilities and payoffs are averages since we randomly perturbed the
probabilities by up to 2 percentage points and payoffs were randomly varied between 19x, 20x, and 21x
times the “low” payoffs used in Holt & Laury (2002)
Observing Information Acquisition
The method I employ to observe individual information acquisition behavior is
known in decision research as “process tracing.” Process tracing can be accomplished in
a variety of ways, but all of these techniques have the common objective of providing
a window for the researcher into the cognitive process that an individual uses to
reach a decision. Early forms included manual techniques, such as the acquisition
of information cards (Bettman and Jacoby, 1976; Payne, 1976). Other methods of
process tracing include eye-tracking, verbal protocols, and computer-based programs.4
I utilize a software program called Mouselab that has been used previously by
economists to explore other types of information acquisition and decision making
4See Arieli et al. (2011) for a recent example of an eye-tracking experiment that examines subjects’
eye movements while they are considering two lotteries. Ford et al. (1989) reviews 45 experiments
that use verbal protocols or “information board” techniques. See Cokely and Kelley (2009) for a
recent example of a verbal protocol experiment. Verbal protocol experiments have the subjects
verbalize their decision-making process. Information board techniques were more common before the
computer revolution in the 1980s and required subjects to go to a board and turn over cards with
information about the alternatives being considered in the choice scenario.
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(Costa-Gomes et al., 2001; Gabaix et al., 2006; Johnson et al., 2008). In a way,
Mouselab is a lower-tech, more expedient alternative to eye-tracking technology and
provides analogous measures of attention. Mouselab has been used by psychologists as
a lower-cost alternative to eye-tracking for more than two decades (Payne et al., 1988).
Mouselab enables the researcher to “mask” selected information so that a subject
must move the computer pointer over the attribute to reveal it. In the experiment, the
probabilities and payoffs (the attributes) of each gamble are masked and require the
individual to “unmask” the attributes by scrolling over the cell with that information
in order to view it. An example of how each pair of gambles was presented to subjects
in our experiment is shown in Figure 1. Once the mouse pointer leaves the cell, the
attribute is hidden again. By requiring a subject to unmask the gambles’ attributes
and allowing them to view only one piece of information at a time, the process by which
individuals acquire information about risky choices is observable to the researcher in
this stylized context.5
Information Acquisition Behavior
It is useful to distinguish the information that a subject acquires in terms of its
breadth and its depth. I define breadth as the fullness of an individual’s information
set and measure it in three ways. The first breadth measure is how many unique
attributes a subject opened for a given choice. Each choice has eight cells, so this
measure will range from zero to eight for each choice.6
5The experiment was presented in color. Subjects were required only to “mouseover” an attribute
to reveal it and were not required to “click” on the attribute. Requiring a click is a design feature we
could have employed but we believe that it would increase the differences between our design and an
eye-tracking design without an obvious benefit.
6To account for the possibility that subjects may “accidentally” unmask a cell we include only
acquisitions for which a cell is unmasked for at least 100 milliseconds (Payne et al., 1993). However,
our results are not qualitatively different if we use a 50 millisecond threshold.
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FIGURE 1. Choice example
The second measure of information set breadth is whether a subject viewed at
least one probability in each gamble and all four payoffs in a given choice scenario. This
measure acknowledges that some subjects will recognize the complementary nature of
the probabilities in each gamble as well as the fact that they can compute expected
value without opening both probabilities. This measure is called EV-sufficient, and it
takes a value of zero or one for each choice depending on whether the subject viewed
sufficient attributes to compute expected value.
The third measure of information set breadth is determined at the subject level
and is an indicator for whether a subject satisfied the EV-sufficient measure for all
ten choices in the task. In other words, it indicates whether the subject unmasked
enough information on all ten choices to compute the expected value of both gambles.
This measure is referred to as EV-sufficient All Choices.
An alternative way to think about information acquisition behavior is in terms of
its depth. Whereas the breadth indicates the completeness of the information set, the
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depth provides a measure of how “deeply” an individual considers the information
available to him before he makes a decision. The depth of a subject’s information
set is measured by the number of cells that she opens (including repetitions) before
making a choice, as well as how much time she spends making a choice. I also explore
whether subjects open probabilities and payoffs differently across settings.
There is no doubt that subjects are willing to devote at least some time to the
consideration of hypothetical choices. Psychologists frequently rely exclusively on
hypothetical decisions to explore questions of interest. Some of these studies have
used Mouselab or other process-tracing techniques and these studies demonstrate that
individuals do spend time considering hypothetical choices. The question of interest
here, however, concerns whether the amount of time and effort that individuals
devote to hypothetical decisions is different from the amount they devote to real
decisions. Also, given the variety of information made available to the individual in
our experiment, is there a difference—across real and hypothetical decisions—in the
types of information subjects choose to acquire, or in how thoroughly they attend to
it?
Modifications to the Multiple Price List
The goal is to observe how subjects acquire information about alternatives under
uncertainty while simultaneously measuring their risk attitudes. Thus, in addition
to masking the attributes of the gambles and requiring subjects to unmask them, I
depart from previous studies that have used the conventional MPL design in four
other important ways.
(a.) Randomized order of the choices. First, the order of the pairs of gambles is
randomized and subjects are presented with only one pair of gambles at a time. Again,
the conventionally ordered presentation of the MPL is shown in Table 1. Facing this
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conventional order, once an individual switches from the safe gamble to the risky
gamble, it would be inconsistent (according to expected utility theory) to switch
back to the safe gamble in subsequent decisions. In fact, several studies simply show
subjects all ten choices at the same time and ask them to identify the gamble-pair
at which they would switch.7 That structure is not imposed here. I believe it is a
virtue of our design to shuﬄe the order in which the choices are presented as well as
to present only one pair of gambles at a time. This design allows me to disentangle
(a.) how individuals acquire information about more difficult choices in terms of
the difference in their expected values, from (b.) learning effects that may occur as
subjects become more familiar with the experimental design. In fact, if the order in
which the pairs of gambles are presented is not randomized, a subject could avoid
unmasking any attributes by the time she reaches the eighth or ninth gamble-pair in
the conventionally ordered MPL. With experience, he could guess the values of the
attributes.
(b.) Random perturbations in probabilities. Second, the probabilities are randomly
perturbed, dynamically, by up to two percentage points on each gamble.8 For instance,
consider HL Decision 7 in the conventionally ordered MPL. Rather than seeing a
70 percent chance of the high payoff in both the safe and risky gambles, a subject
could be presented with a 72 percent chance of the high payoff in Gamble A and
a 68 percent chance of the high payoff in Gamble B. A small perturbation of the
probabilities is necessary to minimize subjects’ easy recognition of the similarity of
the probabilities across gambles. Two percentage points is large enough to keep
7Harrison et al. (2007) employ this strategy, as do Tanaka et al. (2010) in a modified version of
the MPL.
8PHP code was written so that the probability of the high payoff for each gamble was randomly
determined within a specified range. This probability is then subtracted from 1 to determine the
probability of the low payoff in each gamble.
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the probability information valuable, while preserving the monotonically decreasing
relationship in the difference in expected values of the gambles. Without these
perturbations, the probabilities in both gambles in a gamble-pair would have been
equal and subjects would have been able to unmask a single probability and infer
the other three probabilities. It is still possible for a subject to infer the likely range
of the probabilities of the other gamble after unmasking only one gamble, but not
the exact probabilities. The data suggest that individuals considered the probability
information worth unmasking; subjects unmasked at least one probability in each
gamble in roughly 92 percent of the choices.
(c.) Random scaling of the payoffs. Third, the payoffs for each pair of gambles
were randomly scaled by a multiple of 19, 20, or 21 times the “low” payoffs used
in Holt and Laury (2002). In that study, the low payoffs for the safe gamble were
$2 and $1.60 and the low payoffs for the risky gamble were $3.85 and $0.10. In our
experiment, if the payoffs for a gamble-pair were scaled by 19, then a subject saw safe
payoffs of $38 and $32 and risky payoffs of $73 and $1.90 for that particular pair of
gambles. If a gamble-pair was scaled by 21, then a subject saw safe payoffs of $42 and
$34 and risky payoffs of $81 and $2.10. The “20 times” scale is shown in Table 1. The
scale of the payoffs is varied here because if they were the same, subjects might have
begun to ignore this information after making just a few choices.
(d.) Randomization of the choice format across subjects. Finally, to address
concerns about possible left-to-right and top-to-bottom bias in subjects’ attention to
different areas in a choice display, the presentation of the gambles is randomized along
three different dimensions. I altered (i) whether the probabilities or the payoffs are
presented in the top row; (ii) whether the safe gamble or the risky gamble was situated
on the left; and (iii) whether the high payoff or low payoff was on the left within each
gamble. These randomizations are by subject, and not across choice scenarios for
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any one subject. The instructions for each subject are designed so that the tutorial
material is presented in the same format as the actual choice scenarios that are later
displayed for that subject.
Experimental Sessions
The experiment was completely computer-based and the subject’s interaction
with experimenters was minimal.9 A typical session included about four (3.6) subjects
but never more than six, and subjects were isolated by dividers. Before subjects began
the experiment, they were read some instructions that explained that they would
be asked to make some choices and that there were no correct choices. They were
also told that they were not competing against one another.10 The remainder of the
instructions, including a tutorial that explained the choices to the subjects and tested
their understanding, were all presented via the computer. Appendix A includes the
full script of these instructions along with an example of how the experiment was
presented to subjects.
Each subject made choices in both the real and hypothetical treatments. The type
of treatment each subject received first was randomly assigned. It was not revealed to
subjects at the beginning of the experiment that they would receive both real and
hypothetical treatments, only that there would be two sections, and in each section
9The interaction between the subjects and the experimenters was limited to signing in the subjects,
reading a brief set of general instructions, verifying the subject’s payment, and paying the subject.
10They were further instructed that if they had any questions they should write them down on
the note card next to their computer and then raise their hand and we would check to see if it was
a question that we could answer. Having subjects write down any questions served two purposes.
First, we simply wanted to minimize the distractions to the other participants. Second, because
some subjects saw the real choices first and others saw the hypothetical, we wanted to reduce the
possibility that a question from one subject would reveal the nature of the alternative treatment to
other subjects. No one asked a question during the instruction portion of the experiment. A few
students asked clarifying questions during the numeracy tests and the debriefing questionnaire. For
example, some asked whether they could use a calculator (they could not).
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they would be asked to make some choices. All subjects received the same instructions
and the same tutorial about how the gambles would be presented and how to unmask
the probability and payoff information relevant to their choices. The computer-based
tutorial explained the gambles to the subjects using a vignette in which they were
asked to imagine that there were two opaque jars filled with green balls and red balls.
They would be shown the probability of drawing a green ball or red ball from each
jar and they would also be shown the payoff associated with drawing each color from
each jar. They were then instructed that they would be asked to choose the jar from
which they would prefer to draw a ball.
Subjects were then informed that there would be two sections (tasks), each
involving some choices. Those who were randomly selected to receive the real-choice
treatment in the first task were informed that they would make ten choices, one of
which would be selected to determine their payoff. These subjects were reminded
that, although only one choice would be selected, each choice was equally likely to be
selected so they should make each decision carefully. Those designated to complete
the hypothetical choices in the first task were informed that they would make ten
choices, one of which would be selected, and they would then be shown how much
their payoff would have been had the choice been real. These subjects were then asked
to consider these choices as if they would count toward their actual payoff.
After these initial instructions, subjects made their first set of ten choices in their
randomly assigned first task. Once this first task was complete, they were notified
that the results from the task would be revealed to them after they had completed
the choices in their second task. Subjects then saw the instructions for whichever
treatment they had not yet completed. After the subjects completed the second
task, the results in terms of the real or the hypothetical payoffs from both tasks were
revealed to them in the order in which the subject completed the tasks.
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Once subjects completed the choice tasks and their payoffs were revealed, they
were asked to complete a test that measured both numeracy and cognitive ability.
Numeracy tests are designed to measure an individual’s ability to understand and
manipulate numeric and probabilistic information. The computational complexity of
our tasks, along with the impact that numeracy could have on information acquisition
behavior, made it prudent for us to elicit such a measure of numeracy. I adapted an
eight-item test developed by Weller et al. (2011) that includes two of the three items
in the cognitive reflective test (CRT) introduced by Frederick (2005). The third item
from Frederick’s CRT is included in the test as well, so I have two separate measures
of ability: a numeracy score that measures a subject’s numeracy, and a CRT score
that measures a subject’s cognitive ability.11
The final section of the experiment was a debriefing questionnaire that inquired
whether subjects had been distracted during the experiment, whether they were
liquidity constrained, the income level of their household, their education level and
educational aspirations, the extent of their math and probability training, their
academic major, and their gender. Table 2 provides selected summary statistics based
on subjects’ responses to this questionnaire.12
Twenty-seven experimental sessions were conducted during March and April
of 2011. A total of 98 people, recruited primarily from undergraduate chemistry,
economics, and environmental studies courses at the University of Oregon, participated
in the experiment. Subjects earned an average total payoff of $52.68, with a maximum
of $86.00 and a minimum of $6.90. Nearly all subjects finished within 40 minutes.
11The complete test is included in Appendix A.
12The complete set of summary statistics is included in Appendix A. Where appropriate, some
response categories are combined into a single category.
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TABLE 2. Summary statistics
Comparison of summary statistics across treatments. “Real First” indicates
subjects completed the real choices in the first task; “Hyp. First” indicates
subjects completed the hypothetical choices in the first task
Variables Real first Hyp. First p-value
N 48 49 –
Female .46 .35 .268
Numeracy Score 4.56 4.43 .545
CRT Score 1.42 1.12 .138
1(Distracted) .04 .06 .667
Stats/Prob. Course .58 .55 .751
Major
Economics .10 .10 .973
Environmental Science .21 .16 .573
Science .23 .22 .957
Business .21 .18 .763
Other .25 .33 .411
Notes: One subject was dropped from the analysis because she did not unmask a
single attribute in seven of her ten choices in the real task. See Appendix B for the
full set of summary statistics.
After dropping one subject because she did not unmask a single attribute in seven
of the ten real choices, the sample includes a total of 97 subjects. Forty-eight subjects
completed the real choices in the first task; the remaining forty-nine completed the
hypothetical choices first. Based on two-sided t-tests, if the sample is partitioned by
whether a subject completed the real or hypothetical choices first, the samples are not
statistically different on dimensions commonly found to be related to risk attitudes.13
Approximately forty percent of the sample is female. Subjects answered 4.49
questions correctly, on average, on the six-item numeracy test. The average number
of correct answers on the three-item CRT is 1.27, which is comparable to the 1.24
average score in Frederick (2005). The two scores have a correlation coefficient of
0.397. Males tended to score higher on both the numeracy test and the CRT, but not
to a statistically different degree (p-value > 0.6044). Only five subjects in the entire
13See Table A.1 in Appendix A.
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sample indicated that they were “distracted at all during this experiment.” More than
half of the subjects have completed a course in which at least two weeks were spent
on probability and statistics. Finally, unlike many experiments that primarily use
economics and psychology majors, our sample is more than one-fifth science majors,
nearly one-fifth environmental studies/science majors, and another one-fifth business
majors.
Risk Aversion
Similar to the findings of Holt and Laury (2002, 2005), Harrison et al. (2005),
Harrison (2006), and Harrison et al. (2007), the sample is risk averse on average.
Figure 2 displays the percentage of subjects who choose the safe option for each of
the ten decisions in the first task. Recall that by design, a risk-neutral individual
using a simple expected value criterion would choose the safe gamble in the first four
decisions and then the risky gamble in the last six. This is shown in Figure 2 as a
step function using a thin dotted line.
The mean number of safe choices is 6.20 in the first task. This is within the range
for the average safe choices observed for subjects facing payoffs of similar magnitude
in previous experiments conducted by Holt and Laury (2002, 2005), where our design
is most similar to their case with “20x” payments. The subjects in their “unordered”
experiment, meaning subjects completed only a single task (real or hypothetical),
made an average of 6.70 safe choices.14
In contrast to Holt and Laury (2002) and Harrison (2006), however, I do not
find differences in implied risk preferences between real and hypothetical settings.
It is clear in Figure 2 that the lines tracing out the percentage of safe choices are
nearly identical. If there were hypothetical bias in the form of lesser risk aversion,
14See page 903 of Holt and Laury (2005) for a summary of their results.
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FIGURE 2. Real versus Hypothetical: Proportion choosing safe gamble in each HL
Decision number in the first task
the locus of choices in the hypothetical setting (the dashed line) would be shifted to
the left if subjects switch sooner to the riskier alternative. Non-parametric tests are
consistent with the results implied in Figure 2. Subjects made 6.23 safe choices on
average in the real setting and 6.17 in the hypothetical setting during the first task.
A test of equal distributions fails to reject the null hypothesis using either a Wilcoxon
rank-sum test or a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (p=0.9765, p=0.998 respectively).15
Moreover, although I focus on the choices in the first task because of possible order
effects (Harrison et al., 2005), there is not a significant difference in the number of
safe choices when all the choices from both the first and second tasks are included.
15I conducted an identical analysis using the decision number of the last safe choice before the first
risky choice and the results are substantively unchanged.
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Within-subject Risk Aversion Across Real and Hypothetical Settings
Analyzing within-subject behavior is problematic in this context because of
order effects (Harrison et al. 2005). However, because my concern is that a subject
may respond differently in a hypothetical setting compared to a real setting, we
are interested in within-subject differences. As a crude non-parametric test, when I
restrict the sample to the 63 subjects who made zero inconsistent choices in either
task, there are 14 subjects who made more safe choices in the real setting than in the
hypothetical setting (22.2 percent of the sample). This means that about one-fifth
of the sample demonstrated “hypothetical bias” in the sense of reduced risk aversion
in the hypothetical setting. However, another 18 percent of the sample chose fewer
safe choices in the real setting than the hypothetical setting, which is a bias in the
opposite direction. In all, 25 out of 63 subjects (39.7 percent) chose a different number
of safe choices in the hypothetical setting than the real setting.
Table 3 shows the results of a logit model in which the dependent variable is
equal to one if the subject chose an equal number of safe choices in both settings.16
In this model, I include an indicator variable for whether the subject completed the
hypothetical choices in the first task, an indicator variable for female, CRT score, and
numeracy score. To control for the overall level of a subject’s effort and attention in
both tasks I include the subject’s average decision duration and the average number
of unique attributes she opened. Finally, I also include a pair of measures to capture
how differently the subject acquired information in the real setting compared to the
hypothetical setting. I compute the difference in the average amount of time the
subject spent on the real choices and the hypothetical choices and the difference in
the average number of unique attributes the subject acquired in the real setting and
the hypothetical setting.
16As I discuss more thoroughly below, reversals capture the noise in a subject’s choices by counting
the number of inconsistent choices among the ten choices in a task. Thus, I am focused only on
subjects who made fully consistent choices in both of their tasks.
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TABLE 3. Within-Subject Comparison of Safe Choices
Results of logit regression where the dependent variable equals
one if the subject chose the same number of safe choices in
both settings.
VARIABLES 1(Equal Safe Choices)
1(Hypot. First Task) -0.872
(0.419)
1(Female) 1.365*
(0.094)
CRT Score 0.001
(0.997)
Numeracy Score 0.863***
(0.007)
Subject’s Mean Decision Duration -0.000
(0.308)
Duration Real - Duration Hypot. -0.000
(0.922)
Subject’s Mean Attributes Unmasked 0.623
(0.200)
Uniq. Attrib. Real - Uniq. Attrib. Hypot 0.210
(0.613)
Constant -6.926*
(0.074)
Observations 63
Notes: Robust p-values in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3 shows that information acquisition behavior is not predictive of choice
differences in real and hypothetical settings. Gender and numeracy, however, have
statistically significant effects in this model. Females are more likely to choose an
equal number of safe choices in both settings, as are subjects that score higher on the
numeracy test. I emphasize that these results apply only to the subjects who made
no reversals in either task. Restricting the sample in this way causes us to drop half
of the forty female subjects who participated in this experiment.
22
Choice Consistency
Previous studies using the MPL design have found inconsistent choice behavior
problematic rather than informative because, at a minimum, it widens the bounds of
the risk aversion parameter. My interest here in the consistency of individuals’ choices
stems from the notion that the level of consistency conveys valuable information about
whether individuals treat hypothetical choices as if they are real. It is conceivable that
subjects choose less consistently because hypothetical choices have no consequences.
However, I do not find that subjects are less consistent in the hypothetical setting
than the real setting, on average.
There are several different ways to measure the level of a subject’s consistency
in a decision task. My preferred measure is one that counts the number of reversals
that a subject makes. As introduced briefly in the previous section, a reversal occurs
when a subject chooses the safe gamble from a gamble-pair after having picked the
risky gamble in the previous choice (when the gamble-pairs are re-arranged into the
conventional Holt and Laury order). Table 4 helps to illustrate this point. Based on
the choices shown in the table, Subject A made only one reversal: HL Decision 7.
Subject B made two reversals: the risky choice for HL Decisions 4 after choosing the
safe choice for HL Decision 3, and the risky choice for HL Decision 8 after choosing
the safe choice for HL Decision 7.17
17An alternative way to measure choice consistency is to count the number of safe options the
subject chooses after choosing a risky gamble in an earlier choice. This measure of inconsistent
behavior may be an overestimate because it counts every risky choice before the inconsistent safe
choice as an inconsistent choice. In fact, it may be the case that only the single safe choice in the
middle of the run of risky choices is actually the inconsistent choice. For example, suppose that
Subject A made three safe choices and then appears to have switched over to the risky gambles at
HL Decision 4. However, he chose the safe gamble on HL Decision 7. Clearly, this is an inconsistent
choice but this measure of inconsistency essentially classifies the risky choices on HL Decisions 4, 5,
and 6 as inconsistent rather than viewing the safe choice on HL Decision 7 as inconsistent. As for
Subject B, if we measure inconsistency as the number of safe choices after the first risky choice then
he has five inconsistent choices.
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TABLE 4. Measuring inconsistency
Example of two subjects’ choices. Subject A
made one reversal. Subject B made two reversals.
Did subject choose the safe gamble? Yes=1
HL Decision # 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Subject A 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Subject B 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0
Given the complexity of the choice tasks, particularly given the random ordering
of the choice scenarios in this experiment and the perturbation of the probabilities in
each gamble—subjects demonstrated a remarkably level of consistency in these tasks.
Table 5 shows that approximately 70 percent of subjects made consistent choices in
the treatment they complete first, regardless of its setting.18 Furthermore, more than
90 percent of subjects completed the first task with one or fewer reversals.
Table 5 shows that subjects did not behave any less consistently in the hypothetical
setting than in the real setting. The distributions of reversals in each setting, when it
was the first task presented to the subject, are nearly identical. A Wilcoxon rank-sum
test fails to reject the null hypothesis that these distributions are equal (p=0.9534).
It is common practice to exclude subjects who choose the safe choice on HL
Decision 10, where the high payoffs in both the safe and risky gamble have 100 percent
probability. The suspicion is that making the safe choice under these conditions
indicates that a subject probably does not understand the instructions. Seven subjects
chose the safe option for HL Decision 10 in this experiment (four subjects who
completed the real choices in the first task and three subjects who completed the
hypothetical choices in the first task). These subjects are included in the present
18Similarly, Le´vy-Garboua et al. (2011) find that 74 percent of subjects made consistent choices
when gamble-pairs were presented sequentially rather than simultaneously when using payoffs half
the size of those we used.
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TABLE 5. Number of Reversals By Setting
# of Reversals
in First Task Real % of Subjects Hypothetical % of Subjects
0 34 70.83 34 69.39
1 10 20.83 12 24.49
2 3 6.25 3 6.12
3 1 2.08 0 0
Note: Between subjects Wilcoxon p-value = .953
# of Reversals
in Second Task Hypothetical % of Subjects Real % of Subjects
0 42 87.50 38 77.55
1 6 12.50 8 16.33
2 0 0 3 6.12
Note: Between subjects Wilcoxon p-value = .169
analysis, however, because in this study the attributes of the gambles are masked
and a subject could have chosen the safe option because he did not have sufficient
information to ascertain the unique properties of Decision 10. Either way, the results
do not differ qualitatively if these subjects are excluded.
The results discussed above suggest that the level of consistency across settings
is independent of whether the task is real or hypothetical. This hypothesis is explored
further by modeling the number of reversals as a function of four factors that could
directly impact an individual’s ability to sufficiently comprehend and integrate the
information in these tasks to arrive at expected values for each gamble: cognitive
ability, the fullness of the subject’s information set, and time spent considering a
choice.19
The level of complexity of the experimental task was sufficiently high that someone
with low cognitive ability may not have been able to understand fully the choices
19Previous exposure to the subject matter of probability and statistics was also included in an
alternative specification but was not statistically significant. The results are not qualitatively different
without it so it is not included here.
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presented to them. Hence, someone with low cognitive ability or low numeracy would
be expected to have more reversals. Also, subjects who did not acquire sufficient
information to compute expected value would be more likely to make more reversals
as well. An individual who unmasked only one attribute must have guessed about
the other attribute levels, and guessing is likely to result in errors that show up as
reversals.
The expected relationship between the amount of time that a subject spends on
each decision and the consistency of her choices in a task is less clear. Subjects must
spend a minimum amount of time simply to acquire enough information to compute
expected value, so subjects may initially improve the consistency of their choices as
they spend more time. Conversely, “excessive” amounts of time could indicate that
a subject is confused or distracted. Based on this reasoning, decision duration is
included in the model quadratically, to account for the possibility that there may
be a non-linear relationship between decision duration and the observed number of
reversals.
The following equation is estimated using a Poisson regression because the
dependent variable, the number of reversals committed by subject i in the first task, is
count data for which a large fraction of the sample equals zero. Within the stochastic
structure of the Poisson model, it is assumed that: where 1(Hypot) is an indicator for
the hypothetical setting, 1(Female) is an indicator for female, Numeracy and CRTi
is the subject’s combined numeracy and CRT score, 1(EV-sufficient All Choices) is an
indicator equal to one if the subject acquired enough information to compute expected
value for every choice in the task, and Mean Ln(Decision Duration)i is the average
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of the natural log of decision duration for all ten choices in the task. The coefficient
estimates for this specification are shown in Table 6.20
These parametric results are consistent with the earlier results which indicate
that subjects did not make systematically more reversals in the hypothetical setting.21
I do find, however, that information acquisition behavior is related to the overall
consistency of a subject’s choices in a task. Subjects who acquired an EV-sufficient
information set for every decision in the task made fewer reversals. Additionally, the
relationship between decision duration and the number of reversals is consistent with
speculation that an increase in decision duration may lead to fewer reversals, but too
much time spent could be a signal of confusion and point to more reversals.
Somewhat surprisingly, cognitive ability and numeracy are not related to the
number of reversals.22 Females tend to make more reversals than males. Why females
tend to make more reversals than males, on average, is puzzling. Females score just
as well as males on the ability test (i.e. the combined numeracy and CRT score)—
5.79 (males) versus 5.71 (females) (t-test p-value = .8340). Females also do not
differ significantly from males in terms of the proportion who have been exposed
to coursework in probability and statistics (60% of males versus 51% of females,
p-value=.3824).
20A Poisson model may be too restrictive if there is over- or under-dispersion in the data, or
if there are an excessive numbers of zeros. I have explored more general specifications for count
data, including negative binomial and zero-inflated models. These specifications do not reject the
restrictions embodied in the Poisson, so I report only the Poisson model.
21An alternative specification was estimated that included interactions between the other variables
in the model and the indicator for hypothetical choices. None of these interactions were significant
and a likelihood ratio test failed to reject the null of equal goodness-of-fit between our model and the
model that included the interactions. As a consequence, we do not include in Table 6 the alternative
specification with these interactions terms.
22Estimating the model with CRT score and numeracy score included separately does not
qualitatively change the results. Moreover, the coefficients and p-values on each score when they are
included separately are nearly identical to those shown in the table.
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TABLE 6. Poisson regression results
where the dependent variable is the
subject’s total number of reversals in
the first task.
Inconsistency
VARIABLES # Reversals
1(Hypot) 0.171
(0.615)
1(Female) 0.771**
(0.015)
Numeracy + CRT -0.051
(0.574)
EV-sufficient All Choices -0.936***
(0.007)
Mean Ln(Decision Duration) -24.479*
(0.058)
Mean Ln(Decision Duration)2 1.290*
(0.056)
Constant 115.075*
(0.063)
Observations 97
Notes: Robust p-values in parentheses.
Negative binomial and zero-inflated Poisson
specifications do not reject the ordinary Poisson
model. Estimating the model with CRT score
and numeracy score included separately does not
qualitatively change the results.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Taken together these results suggest that reversals in this experiment are related
to information deficiencies and gender rather than lower cognitive ability or a lack of
consequentiality. Moreover, there does not appear to be a relationship between the
number of reversals and the real or hypothetical setting in which the choices were
made.
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Breadth of Information Acquisition
Turning to individual information acquisition behavior, I find no evidence to
indicate that individuals acquire less-complete information in the hypothetical setting
relative to the real setting. Table 7 shows the percentage of choices where subjects
viewed sufficient information to compute expected value, EV-sufficient, in each
treatment. Subjects viewed enough information to satisfy the EV-sufficient criterion
in approximately 85 percent of all choices in the task they completed first, regardless
of whether the setting was real or hypothetical. These percentages are not statistically
different across the two settings, based on a t-test (p-value = 0.894).
TABLE 7. Percentage of choices where subjects viewed
sufficient information to compute expected value
(EV-sufficient = 1).
Percent of choices
t-test
Real Hypothetical p-value
First Task 85.00 84.69 .894
Second Task 77.96 62.84 < .001
Things are different, however, in the second task. The second row of Table 7
shows the percentage of choices that were adequately viewed to compute expected
value in this second task. Subjects who completed the real choices in the second task
viewed EV-sufficient information for approximately 78 percent of the choices in this
task. In sharp contrast, subjects who completed the hypothetical choices in the second
task viewed EV-sufficient information for less than 63 percent of the choices. There
is a similar pattern in all five of the information acquisition measures. Specifically,
subjects who completed the real choices in their first task and the hypothetical choices
in their second task acquired less complete information and spent considerably less
time on each choice in the hypothetical setting relative to the real setting.
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I can only speculate as to the reasons for this pattern in information acquisition
behavior between the first and second task for those who completed the real choices
first and hypothetical choices second. One possible explanation may be that subjects
were told that they would complete two sets of choices. Thus, subjects who completed
the real task may have realized, once they received the instructions for the hypothetical
choices in the second task, that their payoff had been fully determined by the first
task. This explanation is unsatisfactory, however, because these same subjects actually
make statistically fewer inconsistent choices in the second task than the first, even
though the second task was hypothetical. In contrast, subjects who completed the real
choices in the second task did not improve in terms of their consistency. Therefore,
it appears that some of the differences in information acquisition in the second task
may be due to an increased level of concentration, or differences in learning, during
the first task. This experiment was not designed to test for these types of “learning”
effects, so the results from the second task are not included in the remainder of this
paper. Further experiments to resolve this issue should clearly be part of the agenda
for research in this area.
The other two measures of information acquisition also do not suggest that
subjects acquire less complete information in the hypothetical setting. Subjects opened
every cell at least once (i.e., they acquired eight unique attributes) in approximately
83 percent of all the choices in the task they completed first, regardless of setting.
Furthermore, the distributions of the number of unique attributes acquired in each
setting in the first task are not statistically different (Wilcoxon p-value=0.871).
The third measure of information breadth captures the completeness of a subject’s
information set for the entire task. Recall that EV-sufficient All Choices is equal to
one if the subject opened sufficient cells to compute expected value for all ten choices
in a task. Only 22 of the 48 subjects who completed the real choices in the first task
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met this criterion. Of the 49 subjects who completed the hypothetical choices first, 23
acquired EV-sufficient information for all ten choices. Again, however, there is not a
statistical difference between the two groups in the percent who viewed all ten choices
(t-test p-value = 0.914).
Figure 3 shows the percentage of subjects who viewed EV-sufficient information
for each choice in the order it was actually presented, i.e., whether they saw the choice
first, second, and so forth. To distinguish the order that subjects completed the choices
in our experiment from the conventional MPL ordering used by Holt and Laury (2002),
the order in which a subject actually completed a choice is referred to as the Position
number, as opposed to the HL Decision number. Both plots in the figure are nearly
horizontal. This means subjects acquire nearly the same breadth of information for
the first choice as they do for the tenth choice they make, which is consistent with
the notion that they treat each choice individually and that they seem to have been
engaged in the choice process through the entirety of the task. Additionally, the plots
for percentage of subjects that satisfy the EV-sufficient criterion follow nearly identical
paths in both the real and hypothetical settings, which is consistent with the finding
above, that the breadth of information acquired is not statistically different across
settings.
Figure 4 shows the percentage of subjects who viewed EV-sufficient information
for each choice arranged instead by HL Decision number. Again, the plots for the real
and hypothetical tasks follow similar paths. However, they also appear to be slightly
higher for the decisions in the middle of the HL ordering, indicating that subjects
sought more-complete information sets for these particular choices. These are the
choices for which the difference in expected value is smallest and where individuals
tend to switch from the safe choice to the risky choice. These choices may have been
“tougher calls.” This pattern is verified in the parametric analysis below.
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FIGURE 3. Real versus Hypothetical: Percent of subjects who
viewed sufficient information to compute expected value by the
position number of the choice in the first task.
FIGURE 4. Real versus Hypothetical: Percent of subjects who
viewed sufficient information to compute expected value in each
decision in the first task.
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Taken together, these results suggest that individuals do not acquire less
information about risky decisions in hypothetical settings than they do in real settings.
Moreover, based on the breadth of information that they acquire throughout our tasks,
it appears that subjects remained engaged throughout the entire task, whether it was
real or hypothetical.
Depth of Information Acquisition
In addition to acquiring information of comparable completeness across settings,
subjects also spend at least as much time considering choices, and open as many cells,
in the hypothetical choices as they do the real choices. Table 8 shows the mean and
median values of decision duration—the amount of time a subject spends making each
decision. For those who completed the real choices in the first task, the mean decision
duration is 13.77 seconds. The mean decision duration for those who completed the
hypothetical choices first is 13.23 seconds. There is slightly more than a half-second
difference between the two means, but a t-test fails to reject the null hypothesis that
the means are equal (p-value=0.425).
There is evidence, however, of a small difference in the median decision duration.
Despite what would be expected if subjects paid less attention to hypothetical choices,
the median decision duration is actually greater for the hypothetical choices than for
the real ones. The median decision duration for real choices is 10.17 seconds, while
that for the hypothetical choices is 11.41. A Wilcoxon rank-sum test rejects the null
hypothesis that the distributions are equal (p-value = 0.011).
The results are similar for acquisition frequency, which is the total number of cells
opened, with repetitions. The first row in Table 9 shows that the mean acquisition
frequency in the first task was 16.13, regardless of the setting so that a t-test of equal
means obviously fails to reject the null hypothesis (p=.998). However, the median
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acquisition frequency in the hypothetical setting is, again, greater than the median
frequency acquisition in the real setting, and a Wilcoxon rank-sum test this time
rejects the null hypothesis of equal distributions (p-value=0.003).
TABLE 8. Decision Duration Across Settings in First Task
Decision duration (in seconds)
Real Hypothetical p-value
Mean decision duration 13.77 13.23 .425
Median decision duration 10.17 11.41 .011
N 480 490
Notes: Decision duration is the amount of time a subject spent on
a choice. p-values are reported for a t-test of the equality of means
(for mean decision duration) and Wilcoxon rank-sum test of equal
distributions (for median decision duration).
TABLE 9. Acquisition Frequency Across Settings in First
Task
Total acquisitions by choice
Real Hypothetical p-value
Mean acquisitions 16.13 16.13 .998
Median acquisitions 13 14 .060
N 480 490
Notes: Mean and median acquisition frequency per choice. p-
values are reported for a t-test of the equality of means (for mean
acquisitions) and Wilcoxon rank-sum test of equal distributions
(for median acquisitions).
Do subjects tend to change their focus between probabilities and payoffs across
real and hypothetical settings? The results in Table 10 show that they do not. Subjects
acquired 8.05 probabilities in the real setting and 7.96 in the hypothetical setting.
Similarly, subjects who completed the real choices in the first task acquired 8.08
payoffs and subjects who completed the hypothetical choices acquired 8.18 payoffs.
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Considering the columns in Table 10, subjects who completed the real choices
opened probabilities and payoffs nearly the same number of times. Those who
completed the hypothetical choices in the first task appear to have a slight tendency to
open the payoffs more than the probabilities, but a t-test that the mean probabilities
acquired and the mean payoffs acquired are equal fails to reject the null hypothesis
(p-value=0.178).
TABLE 10. Probabilities and Payoffs Acquired Across Settings in
First Task
Total acquisitions by choice
Real Hypothetical p-value
Mean probabilities acquired 8.05 7.96 .779
Mean payoffs acquired 8.08 8.18 .784
N 480 490
Notes: Mean acquisitions frequency of probabilities and payoffs acquired
per choice. p-values are for t-test of null hypothesis that mean
probabilities or mean payoffs are equal across settings.
Looking across the two rows of Table 10 allows a comparison of the difference
in probabilities and payoffs acquired across settings. Subjects who completed the
hypothetical choices first acquired 0.22 fewer probabilities than payoffs on average;
subjects who completed the real choices first acquired 0.04 fewer probabilities on
average. Again, however, the difference is not statistically significant. A t-test of the
difference in probabilities and payoffs acquired rejects the null of equal means across
settings (p-value=0.445).
Although there is no statistically significant difference in the central tendencies of
the number of acquisitions of probabilities and payoffs across settings, it appears that
there may be a difference in the distributions of probability and payoff acquisitions.
Figure 5 shows quantile-quantile plots of the total probabilities acquired versus the
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FIGURE 5. Real versus Hypothetical: Quantile-quantile plots of total
probabilities acquired versus total payoffs acquired, by choice in the first
task.
total payoffs acquired in the first tasks. In the plot for the real setting on the left, it
is clear the distributions of probabilities and payoffs acquired are nearly identical for
subjects who made real choices in the first task. The comparable plot for the subjects
who completed the hypothetical choices in their first task appears on the right. The
figure shows that the upper tail of the distribution for payoffs acquired is much longer
than that for the distribution of probabilities acquired.
Turning to the amount of time that subjects spent on each decision, Figure 6
plots the mean amount of time spent, by HL Decision number, for the first task in each
setting. Mean decision duration appears to have an inverted U-shape with respect
to decision number in both settings, even though the actual position number for
each choice was randomized. Given that the calculated differences in expected values
between the gambles are smallest for the decisions in the middle of the conventional
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FIGURE 6. Real versus Hypothetical: Mean decision duration by HL Decision number
in the first task
MPL order, this pattern is consistent with the notion that individuals will spend more
time on decisions that are less clear-cut.23
Visual analysis of the median decision duration, however, suggests a possible
outlier effect in the time spent on the real choices. Figure 7 seems to show that the
increase in median decision duration over HL Decisions 1 through 6 for the real choices
may not be as steep as the increase in the mean decision duration. In fact, median
decision duration decreases for HL Decision 5. In contrast, the plot of median decision
duration for the hypothetical choices looks much like the plot for the hypothetical
choices in Figure 7. This may indicate that differences across real and hypothetical
contexts may be caused by changes in behavior among a small group of outliers rather
than by a shift in median behavior. In effect, it looks as if subjects spend more time
considering the more difficult choices in both the real and hypothetical settings, but
23Glo¨ckner and Herbold (2011) also find that similar expected values increase decision durations.
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FIGURE 7. Real versus Hypothetical: Median decision duration by HL Decision
number in the first task
the financial consequences of the choices in the real setting may induce a small fraction
of subjects to undertake a considerably more deliberative decision process.
Given the graphical evidence of an apparent influence of outliers on the mean
decision duration, differences in the distributions of decision durations across settings
for each HL Decision number are tested using a Wilcoxon rank-sum test. The p-values
for these rank-sum tests are shown by HL Decision number in Table 11 along with
the median decision duration (in seconds) for the same HL Decision numbers. These
tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of equal decision duration distributions across
real and hypothetical settings for each HL Decision number considered separately.
Figure 7 depicts median decision durations by Position number. The figure is
consistent with the expectation that individuals will spend more time on the choices
they see earlier and that decision durations will decrease as subjects become familiar
with the choice format, and supports the decision to randomize the choices to prevent
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TABLE 11. Median Decision Duration
Across Settings for each Decision in First
Task, Ordered by HL Decision Number
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HL Decision Real Hypothetical Wilcoxon
number p-value
1 8.98 10.21 .1076
2 9.27 10.05 .8853
3 10.58 10.99 .5068
4 11.18 12.09 .6862
5 9.74 11.88 .1092
6 11.12 12.06 .7075
7 10.82 13.63 .1045
8 11.31 11.50 .7895
9 9.54 10.55 .2634
10 10.03 11.56 .6598
Notes: p-values are for Wilcoxon rank-sum test of
equal distributions across settings.
this behavior from confounding the analysis. It is evident that subjects reduce the
amount of time spent on each choice as they complete more choices. It also appears
that much of the reduction occurs within the first few choices that subjects complete,
regardless of the HL Decision numbers that these choices represent.24
Overall, these results do not support the hypothesis that individuals put less
effort or consideration into hypothetical choices. In fact, no matter which measure is
used for information acquisition behavior, there is no compelling evidence to indicate
that subjects devote less attention to hypothetical choices than to real choices. Neither
do they focus on different types of information as they make hypothetical versus real
choices.
24I do not include a separate figure plotting the means in this case because it is not discernibly
different.
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FIGURE 8. Real versus Hypothetical: Median time spent
on each decision by Position number in which it was viewed
by the subject in the first task.
Modeling Information Acquisition: Breadth and Depth
Four measures of information acquisition are considered—the number of unique
attributes, whether a subject viewed sufficient information to compute expected value,
decision duration, and acquisition frequency. Each measure is modeled as a function of:
(1) the HL Decision number (and the HL Decision number squared), (2) the position
number of the choice, (3) an indicator variable for whether the choice is hypothetical,
as well as (4) individual characteristics, and interactions of these characteristics with
the indicator for hypothetical choices. Specifically, four different specifications of the
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following form are estimated:
E[InfoAcqcsi] = f([α0 + α11(Hypot)csi] + [γ1 + γ21(Hypot)csi]Decisioncsi (2.3)
+ [γ3 + γ41(Hypot)csi]Decision2csi + [θ1 + θ21(Hypot)csi]Positioncsi
+ [δk1 + δk11(Hypot)]Xi),
where InfoAcqcsi is the information acquisition measure of interest, c denotes the
choice, s denotes the setting, i denotes the individual, Xi is a vector of controls for
gender, and numeracy and CRT score. Standard errors are clustered at the individual
level to account for within-subject error correlation. Depending upon the nature of
the particular information acquisition measures (continuous, binary, or count data),
we specify the model using appropriate functional form and stochastic assumptions.
Table 12 shows the results of these models using data from the first tasks only.
The information acquisition variable explained by each model is specified at the
top of each column. Model 1 contains the results of a Poisson specification where
the dependent variable is the number of unique attributes a subject unmasked for
the choice.25 Model 2 gives the results of a logit regression to explain whether the
subject unmasked sufficient attributes to compute expected value. Decision duration
is modeled using OLS in Model 3. The natural logarithm of Decision duration is used
as the dependent variable since durations are strictly positive. Finally, Model 4 shows
the results for a negative binomial specification for the total number of acquisitions.26
25Negative binomial and zero-inflated Poisson specifications for the number of unique attributes
unmasked were also explored but they failed to reject a Poisson specification.
26Although the results presented here for total acquisitions provide some evidence of over-dispersion,
the coefficient estimates that result from a similar model using a ordinary Poisson specification are
not qualitatively different.
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TABLE 12. Information Acquisition in the First Task
Information acquisition measure used as dependent variable is shown at the top of each column.
Breadth measures Depth measures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES #Unique 1(EV-sufficient) Ln(Duration) #Acquisitions
Attributes (Negative
(Poisson)a (Logit) (OLS) Binomial)
1(Hypot) -0.011 -0.231 0.210 0.006
(0.912) (0.869) (0.504) (0.981)
HL Decision number 0.027** 0.508*** 0.127*** 0.180***
(0.031) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)
(HL Decision #)×1(Hypot) -0.010 -0.161 -0.021 -0.076
(0.513) (0.431) (0.676) (0.109)
HL Decision number2 -0.003** -0.049*** -0.011*** -0.016***
(0.014) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
(HL Decision #)2×1(Hypot) 0.001 0.014 0.001 0.006
(0.646) (0.451) (0.752) (0.145)
Position number 0.000 -0.045 -0.061*** -0.047***
(0.962) (0.486) (0.000) (0.000)
(Position #) ×1(Hypot) 0.000 0.002 0.021** 0.031***
(0.950) (0.978) (0.045) (0.009)
1(Female) -0.047 -0.660 -0.217** -0.220**
(0.154) (0.194) (0.049) (0.040)
1(Female)×1(Hypot) 0.069 0.933 0.185 0.100
(0.134) (0.251) (0.164) (0.433)
Numeracy + CRT 0.010 0.208* 0.046 0.044
(0.143) (0.069) (0.252) (0.173)
(Numeracy + CRT)×1(Hypot) 0.004 0.035 -0.054 -0.005
(0.751) (0.853) (0.260) (0.893)
Constant 1.925*** 0.275 9.194*** 2.471***
(0.000) (0.775) (0.000) (0.000)
α — — — -0.192**
— — — (0.018)
Log-likelihood -1994.67 -394.38 — -3322.78
R-squared .002b .04b 0.12 —
Observations 970 970 970 970
Notes: Standard error estimates clustered on subject. aNegative binomial or zero-inflated Poisson
specifications fail to reject the ordinary Poisson model. bPseudo R-Squared. Estimating the model
with CRT score and numeracy score included separately does not qualitatively change the results.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The statistical significance of the coefficients on the linear and squared terms
in the HL Decision number variable provide additional support for the conclusion
that subjects acquire more-complete information sets and spend more time on the
decisions that are more difficult (i.e., in the middle of the HL Decision list, where the
difference in the expected value of the gambles is smaller). Furthermore, in Models 1
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and 2, which explain information breadth, the coefficient on Position number is not
statistically significant, but Position number is statistically significant in Models 3
and 4 where the specifications model information depth. Once again the econometric
analysis supports the inference, based on simple visual inspection of Figures 3 and 8,
that the completeness of the information set is not related to when in the sequence of
ten choices, a particular choice was presented to the subject. However, the decision
duration and total number of cells opened (i.e., acquisition frequency) both decrease
as subjects advance through the task. it is noteworthy, though, that the decrease
in duration and number of cells opened is actually less in the hypothetical setting
than the real setting. This runs counter to what would be expected if subjects took
hypothetical choices less seriously.
There is also some evidence to suggest that gender and ability are related to
selected information acquisition behaviors. Females tend to spend less time and open
fewer cells than males (i.e., the acquire information of less depth), but they do not
differ significantly in terms of the breadth of their information sets. Ability (numeracy
and CRT combined) appears to be slightly related to the breadth of the information
sets acquired by an individual, but not to decision durations or total acquisitions.
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TABLE 13. Quantile Regression Information Acquisition in the First Task
Information acquisition measure used as dependent variable is shown
at the top of each column.
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Ln(Duration) # Acquisitions
1(Hypot) 0.341 3.535
(0.269) (0.412)
HL Decision number 0.103*** 1.265**
(0.003) (0.015)
(HL Decision #)×1(Hypot) -0.034 -0.731
(0.484) (0.368)
HL Decision number2 -0.008*** -0.103**
(0.007) (0.026)
(HL Decision #)2×1(Hypot) 0.003 0.050
(0.556) (0.496)
Position number -0.062** -0.519***
(0.000) (0.000)
Position×1(Hypot) 0.023* 0.312*
(0.065) (0.097)
1(Female) -0.109 -1.968
(0.291) (0.166)
1(Female)×1(Hypot) 0.059 1.451
(0.647) (0.429)
CRT Score 0.045 -0.081
(0.431) (0.928)
CRT×1(Hypot) -0.067 0.931
(0.338) (0.382)
Numeracy Score -0.008 0.692
(0.864) (0.283)
Numeracy×1(Hypot) -0.055 -0.856
(0.405) (0.307)
Constant 9.355*** 11.022***
(0.000) (0.000)
Observations 970 970
Notes: Bootstrapped standard error estimates clustered on subject.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
A comparison of Figures 6 and 7 on pages 37 and 38, respectively, indicates
that mean and median information acquisition behavior may differ in the case of the
information depth (i.e., decision duration and acquisition frequency). In light of this,
I use a quantile regression to model decision duration and acquisition frequency as a
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function of the same set of regressors describe in Equation (2.3). The results of the
quantile regression specifications are shown in Table 13.
As it turns out, median information acquisition behavior does not differ
significantly from mean behavior in terms of its relationship with the set of regressors
in the model. Again, it is evident that individuals increase the amount of time spent
and acquire more cells as the difference in expected gambles narrows. Moreover, the
median decision duration and acquisition frequency decreased as subjects progressed
through the choices, presumably because their proficiency within this choice context
increases with practice.
Notably, however, the coefficient estimate on 1(Female) is not statistically
significant in either specification in Table 13. In contrast, columns (3) and (4) in
Table 12 show a statistically significant relationship between the indicator variable
for female and decision duration and acquisition frequency. Although the coefficient
estimate is negative in all of the specifications, the lack of statistical significance of
the estimates in the quantile regressions implies that the statistical significance of
the estimates in Table 12 is likely the result of a more heavily skewed distribution of
decision duration for females.
Discussion and Conclusion
I conducted an experiment to test whether information acquisition differs across
real and hypothetical settings in the context of a commonly-used risk preference
elicitation method. Some previous evidence exists to suggests that, on average,
individuals respond differently to hypothetical versus real choices about risk. Although
the potential payoffs in this experiment were relatively large and the research design
increased the amount of subject effort required in the tasks compared to earlier studies
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of risky choices, there is no evidence of “hypothetical bias” in average risk preferences
in this sample.
In both settings, subjects generally acquire sufficient information to make
consistent choices. Furthermore, the level of consistency is the same for the real
and hypothetical choices.
Additionally, there are no significant differences across settings in the amount of
time subjects spend on a choice, or the completeness of the information sets that they
choose to acquire. It does appear that subjects spend more time on choices as the
difference in the expected values of the alternatives narrows. This result is interesting
because in terms of the expected payoff, the cost of making an “error” is lower when
the expected values of the alternatives are similar, yet we observe individuals spending
more time on these choices rather than less time. Thus, it does not appear that the
cost of making an error is an important factor in how much time and effort individuals
devote to choices between risky options.
The apparent increase in consideration for choices for which the difference in
expected value is relatively small also has implications for the debate about whether
individuals actually compute expected value or apply a heuristic. If an individual were
to use a heuristic to decide between the risky alternatives in a choice, the time spent
on a choice would be independent of the difference in expected values. Conversely, if
someone was computing expected values, then we would expect her to spend more
time on choices as the alternatives become more alike and that is exactly what we
observe here. In the following chapter, I explore the question of whether individuals
acquire information in a manner more consistent with expected utility theory or the
application of a simplifying heuristic.
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CHAPTER III
ELICITING RISK PREFERENCES? INFORMATION ACQUISITION IN A
COMMONLY USED METHOD OF ELICITING RISK PREFERENCES
An expected utility (EU) framework underpins most economic theories that seek
to explain decision making under risk. Expected utility theory assumes that the utility
of a risky set of outcomes is the probability-weighted average of the outcome utilities,
and that individuals make decisions by comparing these probability-weighted average
utilities, or expected utilities. Observed individual decision making behavior that is
inconsistent with fundamental assumptions of EU theory has led many to doubt the
generalizability of the theory (e.g., the Allais’ paradox (1953)).1
Some efforts to account for such “anomalies” in decision making relative to
the theory attempt to maintain, but modify, the assumption that outcomes are
weighted in some way by the probabilities. Prospect theory, for example, incorporates
insights from psychology while maintaining a framework that integrates transformed
probabilities and outcomes; in particular, a value function for each possible outcome
is multiplied by a decision weight (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and
Kahneman, 1992). Models which maintain the assumption that individuals integrate
probabilistic information and outcomes when making decisions can be broadly classified
as integration models.
In contrast to integration models, another class of models hypothesizes that
the complexity of many decisions leads individuals to resort to “rules of thumb” or
1See Camerer (1995) for a catalog of behavior inconsistent with expected utility. The Allais
paradox is a violation of the independence axiom of expected utility theory that occurs as a result
of the certainty effect. The certainty effect is a “preference for security” in the neighborhood of
certainty (Allais, 2008). Also see Kahneman and Tversky (1979) for a discussion of the certainty
effect and the Allais paradox.
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heuristics to simplify the decision process (Newell and Simon, 1972; Kahneman and
Tversky, 1982; Payne et al., 1993; Gigerenzer et al., 1999; Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier,
2011). Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (2011) define heuristics as “strategies that ignore
information to make decisions faster, more frugally, and/or more accurately than
more complex methods” (p. 454). Some common heuristics discussed in the decision-
making literature include: the recognition heuristic, tallying rules, take-the-best, and
fast-and-frugal trees. Economists, however, may be more familiar with the heuristics
highlighted in Kahneman and Tversky (1982): representativeness, availability, and
anchoring.2
Despite the conflicting theories about how individuals actually process information
when making a decision, economists have made surprisingly few attempts to explore
whether individuals appear to be processing information in a manner consistent with
EU theory, or any integration theory for that matter. As noted by Willemsen and
Johnson (2010), decision making research has tended to progress by focusing on choice
outcomes rather than the process by which people arrive at decisions. Recently,
however, economists have exploited technologies that make it possible to observe
individual information acquisition behavior to test theories of decision making (Costa-
Gomes et al., 2001; Gabaix et al., 2006; Johnson et al., 2008; Arieli et al., 2011), and
a few studies have explored whether individuals acquire information in a manner that
is more consistent with an integrative decision process or the application of a heuristic
(Johnson et al., 2008; Arieli et al., 2011; Glo¨ckner and Herbold, 2011).
Previous studies that examine whether individuals acquire information as if
they were integrating information or applying a heuristic have reached contradictory
conclusions. Johnson et al. (2008) and Glo¨ckner and Herbold (2011) both find
2See Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (2011) for a discussion of the first set of heuristics as well as a
summary of the evolution of research focused on heuristics. See Kahneman and Tversky (1982) for a
summary of the latter set of heuristics.
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information acquisition patterns consistent with integration models, while Arieli et al.
(2011) do not. The conflicting results do not appear to be caused by differences in
how information acquisition was observed. Glo¨ckner and Herbold (2011) and Arieli et
al. (2011) use eye-tracking technology, while Johnson et al. (2008) uses process-tracing
software called Mouselab, which is the method used in the present study and is
described below. Of these studies, Arieli et al. (2011) is the only study that examined
information acquisition using gambles that had only one positive payoff (i.e., one of the
possible outcomes in both options was zero, so these outcomes and their corresponding
probabilities were not shown). Thus, each gamble required that subjects acquire only
two pieces of information rather than the four pieces of information presented to
subjects in Johnson et al. (2008), Glo¨ckner and Herbold (2011), and the present study.
My examination of the decision making process contributes to the literature
in several ways. First, I observe information acquisition behavior in both real and
hypothetical settings, whereas previous studies use only hypothetical payoffs. Second,
I observe information acquisition within a commonly-used method of eliciting risk
preferences that entails many similarly structured choices. Thus, I am able to examine
the evolution of information acquisition as subjects progress through a standard
method of eliciting risk preferences. Third, I avoid a framing effect that may have
biased Johnson et al. (2008) toward finding information acquisition behavior consistent
with integration models of decision making. In their study, each gamble presented
to a subject in a choice was entirely contained in a single row or column. Thus,
simple effort-minimizing row (or column) scans, from left to right, or right to left,
would be confounded with an integrative search pattern in their study. In contrast,
in this experiment, gambles were presented to subjects so that the probabilities are
either directly above or directly below their associated payoffs, while alternatives are
presented side-by-side.
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Consistent with Johnson et al. (2008) and Glo¨ckner and Herbold (2011), I find
evidence to suggest that subjects acquire information in a manner consistent with the
implicit calculation of expected utility. Specifically, individuals do not merely make
choices “as if” they are integrating probabilities and outcomes, it appears that they
actually are. Moreover, as they progress through a series of choices in a commonly used
risk preference elicitation method, their information acquisition becomes progressively
more consistent with integration models. Finally, on average, individuals appear to
acquire information in real and hypothetical settings in similar ways. This insight is
important to the ongoing debate about whether hypothetical choices can be used to
elicit real preferences.
The Method
In the decision research literature, observing individual information acquisition
behavior is known as “process tracing.” Process tracing can be accomplished in a
variety of ways, but the varying techniques have the common objective of providing
a window (for the researcher) into the cognitive process that an individual uses to
reach a decision. Early forms included manual techniques, such as the acquisition
of information cards (Bettman and Jacoby, 1976; Payne, 1976). Other methods of
process tracing include eye-tracking, verbal protocols, and computer-based programs.3
I use a software program called Mouselab to observe subjects’ information
acquisition behavior. In a way, Mouselab is a lower-tech, more expedient alternative
to eye-tracking technology and provides analogous measures of attention, such as the
3Ford et al. (1989) reviews 45 experiments that use verbal protocols or “information board”
techniques. See Cokely and Kelley (2009) for a recent example of a verbal protocol experiment.
Verbal protocol experiments, also called “think aloud” protocols, have the subjects verbalize their
decision-making process. Information board techniques were more common before the computer
revolution in the 1980s and required subjects to go to a board and turn over cards with information
about the alternatives being considered in the choice scenario.
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frequency of fixations on an attribute, duration of fixations on an attribute, transitions
between areas of interest (AOIs), and the first fixation.4 Mouselab software has been
used by psychologists as a lower-cost alternative to eye-tracking for more than two
decades (Payne et al., 1988), and several recent studies by economists have used it to
explore information acquisition and decision making behavior (Costa-Gomes et al.,
2001; Gabaix et al., 2006).5
Mouselab works by allowing the researcher to “mask” selected information so
that a subject must move the computer pointer over the cell with the information so
that it will be revealed. Once the mouse pointer leaves the cell, the information is
hidden again. By requiring a subject to unmask each cell and allowing them to view
only one piece of information at a time, I am able to observe how individuals acquire
information about risky choices in this stylized context.6
The Task
Data on subjects’ information acquisition behavior was collected in the context
of an experiment in which they were asked to choose between two lotteries. The
4“Fixations are moments during which the eye is relatively still, typically lasting around 200-500
milliseconds” (Rayner, 1998). A reaquisition occurs when the eyes are refocused on a piece of
information after shifting their gaze somewhere else.
5Several studies have compared Mouselab with eye-tracking technology. Reisen et al. (2008)
“found only minor differences between” eye-tracking technology and Mouselab in terms of their
abilities to describe information search and strategies. However, in a comparison of process tracing
data generated from eye-tracking and Mouselab, Lohse and Johnson (1996) find that “the method
of recording information acquisition influenced the decision process.” For example, subjects using
eye-tracking equipment used less time, made more fixations, and made more reacquisitions than the
subjects using Mouselab. Franco-Watkins and Johnson (2011) find similar results. This differences
are unsurprising given the greater effort required to move a mouse relative to merely shifting one’s
gaze. However, there does not appear to be evidence to indicate that subjects alter the pattern of
their acquisitions. In other words, a subject might make fewer acquisitions but does not acquire
different information, or acquire the information in a different order, when using a mouse.
6Subjects were required only to “mouseover” a cell to reveal it and were not required to “click”
on the cell. Requiring a click is a design feature that could have been employed but I believe that it
would increase the differences between our design and an eye-tracking design without an obvious
benefit.
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lotteries presented to subjects were a modified version of the Multiple Price List (MPL)
introduced by Holt and Laury (2002), which asks subjects to make ten choices between
a safe lottery and a risky lottery. Both lotteries are characterized by uncertainty and
have a high and low payoff, but the risky lottery has a greater variance in its payoffs.
Table 1 illustrates the conventionally ordered MPL format. Subjects were provided
only with the probability and payoff information in Columns (1) through (4).
Several modifications were made to the conventional MPL so that valid information
acquisition behavior could be collected. First of all, the probabilities and the payoffs
of the lotteries were masked, so subjects were required to unmask the attributes of
the lotteries. Second, the order in which the choices were presented to subjects was
randomized. This “shuﬄing” of the order of the MPL means that the position in
which a subject completed a choice almost certainly differs from the choice order in the
Holt and Laury MPL. Hence, for each subject a particular choice has its HL Decision
Number (i.e., where that choice sits in the conventional MPL), and its Position Number
(i.e., the order in which a subject actually completed the choice in the task).
The third modification is that small perturbations were made to the probabilities
and payoffs to prevent subjects from easily recognizing the patterns in the MPL.7
Fourth, the presentation of the lotteries was randomized along three dimensions to
address framing effects: half of the subjects were presented with the probabilities
in the top row, half saw the risky gamble on the left, and half saw the high payoff
outcome on the left within each gamble. An example of how each pair of gambles was
presented to subjects is shown in Figure 1.8
7For details of the MPL and the modifications should see Taylor (2011).
8The experiment was presented in color.
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Search Patterns and Decision Making
To explore whether information is consistent with EU theory, I focus primarily
on the transitions that subjects make between boxes in the process of acquiring
information about the choices.9 A brief comment on notation is in order before going
further. I adopt the notation used byJohnson et al. (2008) and denote the payoffs in
the following way, W yx , where W denotes payoffs, x = safe, risky and y = min,max.
Probabilities are labeled P yx , where P denotes probability. Hence, for example, Wminsafe
denotes the minimum payoff in the safe option and Pmaxrisky denotes the probability of
the maximum payoff in the risky option.
Transitions are classified into six types: within-gamble transitions, across-
gamble transitions, same-cell transitions, within-outcome transitions, across-outcome
transitions, and same-attribute transitions. Within-gamble transitions are transitions
from one cell to another cell within the same gamble. This includes all transitions
between cells with the same subscript (e.g., Pmaxsafe to Pminsafe). A transition from a cell in
one gamble to a cell in the other gamble (from the safe gamble to the risky gamble or
vice versa) is classified as an across-gamble transition. There are also rare occurrences
when a subject moves the mouse out of a cell and then immediately back into the
same cell—same-cell transitions. All possible transitions can be classified into one of
these three transition types.
Within-gamble transitions can be delineated further into two distinct types:
within-outcome transitions and across-outcome transitions. Within-outcome transitions
are transitions between a probability and its corresponding payoff, or a payoff and
its corresponding probability. The subscript and the superscript for transitions of
9Those interested in the details about what information was acquired, how long subjects spent
on choices, and other measures of the breadth and depth of information acquisition can see Taylor
(2011).
53
this type are the same— Pmaxsafe to Wmaxsafe , for instance. Transitions that occur within a
gamble, but cannot be classified as within-outcome transitions (e.g., a transition from
Pmaxsafe to Wminsafe), are referred to as across-outcome transitions for simplicity, although
in a strict sense any transition that is not within-outcome could be classified as such.
The last type of transition occurs when a subject moves the mouse from an
attribute in one gamble to the same attribute in the other gamble: same-attribute
transitions. A transition from Wmaxsafe to Wmaxrisky is one potential same-attribute transition
and this type of transition is the most consistent with a subject applying a heuristic
that requires the comparison of attributes across gambles. For example, a subject
using a “take-the-best” heuristic with the highest potential payoff criterion would be
expected to transition from the cell with the high payoff in one gamble directly to the
cell that contains the high payoff in the other gamble.
Interdimensional versus Intradimensional Nomenclature
Early studies that explored decision making via process-tracing data classified a
transition by whether it is interdimensional or intradimensional (Payne, 1976; Payne
and Braunstein, 1978; Rosen and Rosenkoetter, 1976). Interdimensional strategies are
manifested in search patterns characterized by within-alternative transitions between
the different “dimensions” of a particular alternative (i.e., within-outcome and within-
gamble transitions) suggesting that a subject is integrating the pieces of information
for that alternative. Intradimensional strategies are characterized by transitions across
alternatives within the same attribute and are more consistent with the application of
a heuristic because such transitions suggest that a subject is comparing alternatives
along particular dimensions rather than by integrating information.10
10Arieli et al. (2011) adopt a different nomenclature. They refer to holistic procedures
(interdimensional) and component procedures (intradimensional).
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A within-outcome transition is the most narrowly defined type of interdimensional
transition. In other words, this is the type of transition that is most consistent
with a subject computing expected value. More broadly, however, all within-
gamble transitions, both within-outcome and across-outcome, could be termed
interdimensional transitions. In a strict sense, only same-attribute transitions are truly
intradimensional and they are the least consistent with integration models. However,
I classify any across-gamble transition as an intradimensional transition.
Occurrence and Adjacency
Two properties must hold for information acquisition behavior to be linked
to decision making (Costa-Gomes et al., 2001). The first property is occurrence:
information must be acquired before it can be used by a decision maker. The second
property, adjacency, is that information that will be used together should be acquired
in close proximity in a sequence of unmaskings (for example, a probability and a
payoff in the computation of expected value). Adjacency assumes that it less costly to
acquire information as needed than to memorize it.
In the current context, occurrence implies that if a subject is observed making
decisions without acquiring information about the probabilities, then he could not
be using that information to make decisions. This property is not controversial.
Adjacency implies that when a subject transitions between a payoff and its associated
probability, in either direction, then it is more likely that the product of the payoff and
its associated probability, an expected value ingredient, is being used in the decision
making process. Unless subjects are memorizing attributes so that the order of
acquisition is irrelevant (i.e. if adjacency does not hold), search patterns characterized
by intradimensional transitions suggest that subjects are applying heuristics.
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If the occurrence and adjacency properties hold, then one straightforward way to
test whether individuals are integrating information about the options presented to
them, or applying a heuristic, is to check whether they tend to make predominantly
within-outcome transitions or same-attribute transitions.
Heuristics
Individual decision making behavior can vary widely depending on the task and
context, and there is no one dominant strategy applicable to every type of decision
(Payne et al., 1993). The choices presented to subjects in this experiment are sufficiently
complex that it is plausible that they could employ a heuristic when making their
decisions. Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (2011) stress that a rule or heuristic must be
“ecologically rational,” meaning that the heuristic is, or can be, adapted to the structure
of the environment in which it is being used. Lexicographic rules and tallying, for
example, can be adapted easily to choices between two gambles, such as those used in
this experiment.
Lexicographic rules rank the reasons that an individual can use to decide between
two alternatives, and decisions are then based on one reason only. In other words, in
the two-alternative case, an individual using a lexicographic rule will proceed through
a list of m different reasons and then make her choice based on the first reason for
which one alternative has an advantage. In contrast, tallying rules do not impose an
order on the reasons and an individual simply picks the option that is supported by
the most reasons. Prior empirical evidence, as well as the results presented below,
suggests that individuals do not use tallying rules when choosing between gambles
(Brandstatter et al., 2006; Johnson et al., 2008). In particular, for the choices in this
experiment, at least four same-attribute transitions are required if a subject is using
a tallying rule and, as discussed below, subjects do not make anywhere near this
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many acquisitions. Thus, it is reasonable to focus on just the class of lexicographic
heuristics.
A variety of one-reason lexicographic rules are readily adaptable to choices between
two gambles such as those presented to subjects in this experiment. A risk-averse
subject who chooses her preferred gamble based solely on the largest minimum payoff
(maximin strategy) provides an example of a take-the-best heuristic being employed.
Alternatively, she could choose the gamble with the highest potential payoff, highest
probability, and so forth.
Reading Phase
In the heuristics literature, it is typically assumed that there is an initial reading
“phase,” in which subjects explore all the information so that they can identify the
relevant pieces of information (Brandstatter et al., 2006). It is seems to be an empirical
question, however, whether individuals actually delineate their searches into separate
phases because expected utility theory does not require a reading phase. The most
appropriate way to test whether subjects divide their searches into reading and choice
phases is not entirely obvious. One reasonable check, though, is whether subjects
acquire all the available information in as few acquisitions as possible.11
Johnson et al. (2008, p. 266) define the reading phase, in a straightforward way,
as “all acquisitions made before all outcomes have been examined at least once.” Thus,
if subjects divided their searches into a reading phase and a choice phase, we might
expect that the number of acquisitions that they make to acquire all eight pieces of
11Another possible check is the proportion of total acquisitions that occur before a subject acquires
all the information. A small proportion could imply that a subject first scanned through all the
information and then completed a more thorough evaluation in the choice phase. However, a large
proportion does not rule out the possibility that subjects separated their searches into two phases.
In fact, the median proportion of acquisitions made before a subject acquired all the information is
seventy-five percent.
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information would be very little in excess of eight. In fact, of the choices in which a
subject viewed all the information, the median acquisition number at which all the
information was viewed is ten.12 This seems consistent with the idea of a reading
phase because it implies that subjects did not do a lot of preliminary exploring before
they eventually acquired all the available information. Since it is possible that subjects
are dividing their searches into two phases, when appropriate, I examine information
acquisition in the reading phase and choice phase separately.
Priority Heuristic
A more sophisticated heuristic is the priority heuristic , which Brandstatter et
al. (2006) demonstrate has remarkable predictive ability and can account for decision
anomalies such as the Allais paradox, the certainty effect, and the four-fold pattern of
risk preferences.13 The priority heuristic is a lexicographic heuristic that prioritizes the
order of the reasons individuals use by incorporating previous empirical findings which
suggest that payoffs (minimum payoffs in particular) matter more to subjects than
probabilities, and psychological concepts, such as bounded rationality (Gigerenzer and
Gaissmaier, 2011). Specifically, the priority heuristic hypothesizes that risk aversion
will lead individuals to devote the most attention to minimum payoffs.
The priority heuristic is richer than the simple maximization of the minimum
payoff, though. It also allows for the possibility that decisions are affected by other
12The sample for this statistic includes the 805 of 970 choices for which subjects viewed all eight
pieces of information in the first task. Although the complementary nature of the probabilities
requires that a subject unmask only one probability in each gamble, there are only 18 instances in
which a subject acquired just one probability in each gamble and all four payoffs and did not also
acquire the remaining probabilities. In other words, if a subject acquired the six pieces of information
necessary to compute expected value, then they generally acquired all eight pieces of information.
13The four-fold pattern is: (a) risk aversion for gains if probabilities are high, (b) risk seeking for
gains if probabilities are low, (c) risk aversion for losses if probabilities are low, and (d) risk seeking
for losses if probabilities are high. Harbaugh et al. (2002b) and Harbaugh et al. (2002a) explore the
robustness of the four-fold pattern.
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potential payoffs in a choice. In particular, the priority heuristic formalizes the notion
that the highest potential payoff in a choice will determine an individual’s aspiration
level, and that the aspiration level can affect individual preferences. The notion of an
aspiration level is similar to Simon’s theory of satisficing (Simon, 1983), which theorizes
that bounded rationality will lead individuals to stop searching once an alternative
meets a particular threshold. The priority heuristic posits that the aspiration level is
1/10 of the largest potential payoff and that a comparison of the aspiration level to
the difference in the minimum payoffs is the first reason that individuals use to choose
between alternatives.14 In the present experiment, the size of the largest payoff ranges
from seventy-three to eighty-one dollars, so the aspiration level would be either seven
or eight dollars.
Although the priority heuristic has additional reasons (or decision rules), they
are not relevant here because a subject using the priority heuristic in this experiment
would stop at the first reason because all the choices are structured such that the
difference in the minimum payoffs is always greater than the aspiration level.15 Even
in the case of one-reason choices, however, Johnson et al. (2008) highlight that the
priority heuristic generates several testable hypotheses.
First, payoffs should receive the most attention. Specifically, the priority
heuristic’s hypothesis that individuals compare minimum payoffs directly implies
that minimum payoffs should receive considerable attention and that there should be
transitions between the minimum payoff in the safe option and the minimum payoff in
the risky option. In other words, we should observe subjects directing their attention
towards Wminsafe and Wminrisky, as well as making transitions between the two boxes.
14See Brandstatter et al. (2006) for an explanation of why 1/10 was chosen.
15Interested readers should see Brandstatter et al. (2006); Johnson et al. (2008) for further discussion
of the stopping rules.
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Second, probability-payoff transitions (within-outcome transitions) should be
infrequent, since use of the priority heuristic implies that these transitions are
unnecessary.
Third, during the reading phase, within-gamble transitions should be primarily
between payoffs. This is because subjects are attempting to identify the smallest and
largest payoffs so that the gambles can be compared using the reasons of the heuristic.
The Experiment
The following is a brief summary of the experiment. Please see Chapter II for
full details of the experimental design.
Twenty-seven experimental sessions were conducted during March and April
of 2011. A total of 98 people, recruited primarily from undergraduate chemistry,
economics, and environmental studies courses at the University of Oregon, participated
in the experiment. Subjects earned an average total payoff of $52.68, with a maximum
of $86.00 and a minimum of $6.90. Nearly all subjects finished within 40 minutes.
The experiment was completely computer-based and each subject’s interaction
with experimenters was minimal.16 A typical session included about four (3.6) subjects
but never more than six, and subjects were isolated by dividers.
All subjects completed two sets of ten choices. In addition to a $5.00 show-up
payment, subjects were paid based on the outcome of one randomly selected choice in
one task (the real setting), but were not paid for the randomly selected choice in the
other task (the hypothetical setting). The setting (i.e., real or hypothetical) under
which a subject completed her first task was randomly assigned. Subjects were not
aware that they would complete the task in both real and hypothetical conditions,
16The interaction between a subject and the experimenters was limited to the experimenters signing
in the subject, reading a brief set of general instructions, verifying the subject’s payment, and paying
the subject.
60
but they were made aware of how their choices would affect their payoff (or not)
immediately prior to the beginning of each task.
Once subjects completed both tasks and the payoffs were revealed, they completed
an ability test that measures both numeracy and cognitive ability. Numeracy tests are
designed to measure an individual’s ability to understand and manipulate numeric
and probabilistic information. The potential computational complexity of our tasks,
along with the impact that numeracy could have on information acquisition behavior,
made it prudent for us to elicit such a measure of numeracy. I adapted an eight-item
test developed by Weller et al. (2011) that includes the three-item cognitive reflective
test (CRT) introduced by Frederick (2005). Frederick designed the CRT to evaluate
an individual’s “System 2” cognitive processes — the ability to solve problems that
require “effort, motivation, concentration, and the execution of learned rules” (2005, p.
26). In contrast, “System 1” processes are spontaneous and do not require significant
effort.17 Thus, I have separate measures for a subject’s numeracy and his cognitive
ability.18
After dropping one subject because she did not unmask a single attribute in seven
of the ten real choices, our sample includes a total of 97 subjects. Forty-eight subjects
completed the real choices in the first task; the remaining forty-nine completed the
hypothetical choices first. Based on two-sided t-tests, if we partition the sample by
whether a subject completed the real or hypothetical choices first, Table 2 shows that
the samples are not statistically different on dimensions commonly found to be related
to risk attitudes, such as gender and cognitive ability.
17See Frederick (2005) and Stanovich and West (2000) for discussions of System 1 and System 2
differences. Daniel Kahneman’s Thinking, Fast and Slow highlights the differences in System 1 (Fast)
and System 2 (Slow) cognitive processes (Kahneman, 2011).
18The complete test we use is included in Appendix A.
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Results
Reading and Choice Phase Combined
In the 970 choices completed in the first task, the eight cells were acquired an
average of 16.2 times per choice. This means that subjects made repeated visits to
the same information. Correspondingly, subjects averaged 15.2 transitions in the first
task. These measures decreased in the second task to 12.7 and 11.7, respectively. The
distributions of acquisition frequencies and the transition frequencies are right-skewed.
The median transition frequency was thirteen in the first task and ten in the second
task.
More than eighty percent of all transitions that subjects made can be categorized
as within-gamble transitions. Figure 9 shows the median transition frequency for
within-gamble and across-gamble transitions in each choice. Same-cell transitions
account for only about 1 percent of all transitions, making them sufficiently infrequent
that they are ignored in the remainder of the paper.
The median within-gamble transition frequency in the first task was eleven, while
the median across-gamble transition frequency was two. A Wilcoxon signed-rank test
rejects the null hypothesis that the median transition frequencies are equal (p < 0.001).
Such a large proportion of within-gamble transitions is consistent with an integrative
decision making process. Moreover, the percentage of within-gamble transitions does
not differ by setting (83.7 and 83.6 percent in the real and hypothetical settings,
respectively), and differs only slightly by task (84.1 and 83.2 percent in the first and
second task, respectively (p=0.043, for t-test of equal means)).
Across-gamble transitions account for approximately fifteen percent of total
transitions, which means that the average subject transitioned across gambles only
twice while making a choice in the first task. Additionally, there is not a statistically
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FIGURE 9. Median Transition Frequency by Type in Each Task.
significant difference in this percentage across settings in either task (p-value >
0.211). The median number of across-gamble transitions decreased in the second
task, indicating that once subjects became familiar with the task they made very few
intradimensional comparisons.
As discussed above, the use of a heuristic will generally require that a subject
make same-attribute transitions and that within-outcome transitions will be infrequent.
Figure 10 shows the median transition frequency of within-outcome, across-outcome,
and same-attribute transitions in each task. Only about four percent of transitions
are same-attribute transitions and the median is zero, so the third “bar” in each group
in Figure 3 has height zero.
In contrast, the median within-outcome transition frequency is five. More than
forty percent of the total transitions made by subjects in both tasks are within-outcome
transitions (between a probability and its corresponding payoff or vice-versa) and the
percentage of within-outcome transitions increased in the second task.
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FIGURE 10. Median Transition Frequency by Type in Each Task.
It is helpful to put into context the percentage of within-outcome transitions.
Consider a subject who unmasks every cell once and only once. The highest percentage
that within-outcome transitions can account for in such a scenario is fifty-seven percent
(four divided by seven transitions); the lowest is zero (a subject could unmask all the
information without making a single within-gamble transition). In the case where
a subject that minimizes the distance for each transition, Brandstatter et al. (2008)
hypothesize that the percentage is zero for one-reason choices in the choice phase.
Clearly, this percentage is much greater than zero when we examine the data without
separating it into phases. In the next section, I show that it is greater than zero in
the choice phase as well.
Reading Phase Transitions
Since the reading phase is an exploratory phase, there are few predictions about
how subjects will acquire information in this phase even if they are using a particular
64
decision heuristic because this is the phase in which subjects are presumed to be simply
gathering information. However, as noted above, Johnson et al. (2008) assert that the
priority heuristic would predict that subjects would make within-gamble transitions
between payoffs so that the payoffs can be compared. Additionally, it is informative to
examine whether information acquisition in the racing phase is significantly different
from information acquisition for the choice as a whole.
In the reading phase, the median transition frequency in the first task was nine.
The median within-gamble transition frequency was eight in the first task. Information
acquisition behavior in the second task followed a similar pattern: the median transition
frequency was eight and the median within-gamble transition frequency was seven.
Thus, in both task, information acquisition patterns suggests that subjects gathered
information about each gamble individually in the reading phase.
Figure 11 shows how information was acquired in the reading phase did not differ
significantly from information acquisition in the choice as a whole. Within-gamble
transitions were distributed evenly between within-outcome transitions and across-
outcome transitions and same-attribute transitions were extremely rare, with the
median being zero.
Did subjects appear to be comparing within-gamble payoffs in the reading phase
as the priority heuristic predicts? The median transition frequency for within-gamble
payoff transitions was two. Thus, these type of transitions were certainly not the
primary type of transitions individuals made during the reading phase. However,
given that subjects acquired all the information about the choices with relatively
few transitions, the fact that only the median within-gamble payoff transitions is
zero is not convincing evidence against the priority heuristic either because only two
transitions of this type are required to identify the largest and smallest payoff in each
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FIGURE 11. Median Transition Frequency by Type in Each Task in the
Reading Phase.
gamble. It is worth noting that the median frequency for transitions of this type
decreased to one in the second task.
Choice Phase Transitions
In the choice phase, the median transition frequency in the first task was five for
subjects who acquired all the information and made at least one additional transition.
It decreased slightly in the second task to four.19
Subjects’ information acquisition behavior does not appear to differ significantly
in the choice phase from the reading phase. Figure 12 shows the median transition
frequency for within-outcome, across-outcome, and same-attribute transitions in the
choice phase only. Again, the data appear to show an information acquisition process
19Transitions were non-zero for 655 of the 805 choices for which subjects acquired all eight pieces of
information in the first task. In the second task, transitions were non-zero for 492 of the 656 choices
for which all the information was acquired.
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consistent with integration models rather than a heuristic. The median same-attribute
transition frequency was zero and the median within-gamble transition frequency was
four (two within-outcome and two across-outcome). Thus, even when the decision
process is divided into two phases, the choice phase search process involved primarily
within-gamble transitions.
FIGURE 12. Median Transition Frequency by Type in Each Task in the
Choice Phase.
Given that the median frequency of same-attribute transitions is zero, the median
frequency of transitions between the minimum payoffs is necessarily zero. In fact, of
the 655 choices in which a subject made at least one transition in the choice phase
there are only thirty instances of a transition across gambles between minimum payoffs
in the first task. In the second task, there were only eighteen transitions of this type.
If I focus on just the first choice that subjects made, because that is the one to
which they devote the most time and make the most acquisitions, the results are not
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significantly different. The median transition frequency between minimum payoffs is
zero, and there are only two instances of a subject making such a transition.
Regions of Good and Bad Performance
Thus far, the evidence presented is rather clear that subjects were not using a
intradimensional heuristic for these choices. However, are these the type of choices
for which people would resort to a heuristic? In response to criticism that there are
choice sets for which the priority heuristic cannot predict well, Brandstatter et al.
(2008) point that the same can be said for every model of risky choice. This raises
the question of whether the choices presented to the subjects in this experiment are
well-suited for the use of a heuristic. For example, Brandstatter et al. (2008) show
that the priority heuristic more accurately predicts subjects’ choices than expected
utility theory and cumulative prospect theory when the ratio between the gambles’
expected values is less than or equal to two. The situation is reversed, however, when
the ratio becomes large and the choices are “easy.”20
The ratio of expected values in this experiment range from 1.1 to 3.45 (gambles
with identical expected values have a ratio of one), but the ratio is less than two
for eight of the nine choices that contain uncertainty. If we focus on just the most
“difficult” choices, namely, the two choices for which the ratio of expected values is
approximately 1.1, HL Decision numbers 4 and 5, the results are unchanged.21 Figure
13 shows that the median same-attribute transition frequency was zero for these
decisions; the median within-gamble transition frequency was four.
20Focusing on the ratio of expected values ignores absolute differences between options, which
could be extremely salient when considering gambles with very large stakes. However, given that the
stakes are not in the hundreds of thousands of dollars in this experiment, it seems reasonable to use
the ratio of expected values here.
21Table 1 shows that these two choices also have the smallest difference in expected value.
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FIGURE 13. Median Transition Frequency by Type in Each Task in the
Choice Phase For Choices with a Low Ratio of Expected Value (HL
Decision Numbers 4 and 5).
Another possible explanation for why subjects do not appear to be using a
intradimensional heuristic is because the probabilities do not differ substantially across
the gambles. In cases where all the probabilities are the same, Brandstatter et al.
(2008) propose that individuals may use the toting-up heuristic. This heuristic is
employed when a subject encounters a choice for which all the probabilities are the
same, so they “add up the outcomes of each gamble and select the gamble with the
higher sum” (Brandstatter et al. (2008), p. 284).
The evidence here does not support the hypothesis that subjects were using such
a toting-up heuristic. Even if we allow for any transition from one probability to
any other probability to be considered as evidence in support of such a rule, the
median transition frequency of this type is equal to one during the choice phase. Three
transitions are necessary to sum up the payoffs, however, and there were no occasions
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in which a subject did a simple row search in the choice phase, let alone a row search
of the payoffs.
Overall, the evidence presented here is generally more supportive of the hypothesis
that individuals are integrating information in a manner consistent with expected
utility rather than a heuristic. In fact, same-attribute transitions are relatively rare and
within-gamble transitions make up an overwhelming majority of transitions between
cells. Furthermore, within-outcome transitions, the type of transition most supportive
of the hypothesis that a subject is computing expected utility, account for more
than forty percent of total transitions. Across-outcome transitions, which are also
within-gamble transitions, account for at least another forty percent of total transitions.
Meanwhile, same-attribute transitions—the transition type most consistent with an
individual applying a heuristic—account for less than four percent of total transitions.22
Evolution of Transition Behavior
Tracking subject information acquisition using the Holt and Laury MPL allows us
to observe how subjects’ information acquisition behavior evolves as they make many
similar choices. As subjects progressed through choices in the first task, they tended
to make fewer total transitions for each choice. This suggests that as subjects learned
about the arrangement of the information in the choice scenarios they optimized
their search strategies. Figure 14 shows the decline in median transition frequency by
position number of the choice. The median transition frequency on the first choice is
22It is possible that the spatial separation of the gambles may have biased subjects toward using
within-gamble transitions to acquire information. In other words, because it is more “work” to make
a same-attribute transition relative to a within-gamble transition subjects could, conceivably, make
fewer same-attribute transitions. However, it is not obvious how the information can be presented to
subjects in this type of choice context in a way that will avoid this bias but does not also increase
the difficulty of the choices with an unintuitive arrangement of the information.
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fourteen. The median for the last choice is ten. Time spent on the choices follows a
similar pattern as subjects progressed through the set of choices in the first task.
FIGURE 14. Median total transition frequency in real and
hypothetical setting in the first task. Position number indicates
the order in which the choice was made.
The percentage of transitions that can be classified as within-gamble or across-
gamble are plotted in Figure 15. The figure is consistent with the results in Figure
2, and indicates that, although subjects made fewer transitions as they progressed
through the task, they primarily explored each gamble separately throughout the task
and did not dramatically change the percentage of within-gamble or across-gamble
transitions as they progressed through the first task (Recall that these two types of
transitions effectively account for all transitions.).
Interestingly, when within-gamble transitions are separated into within-outcome
and across-outcome transitions, we see that the type of transition most consistent with
integration models, within-outcome transitions, increases on average as a percentage
of total transitions. The graph on the left of Figure 16 shows that the percentage
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FIGURE 15. Percent of transitions accounted for by the specified
type of transition type in real and hypothetical setting. Position
number indicates the order in which the choice was made.
FIGURE 16. Percent of transitions accounted for by the specified
type of transition type in real and hypothetical setting in the first
task. Position number indicates the order in which the choice was
made.
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of within-outcome transitions increased between the first and tenth choices subjects
completed. The percentage of within-gamble transitions is relatively constant, so
the within-outcome and across-outcome percentages should mirror one another fairly
closely, and they do: the percentage of across-outcome transitions decreased as subjects
progressed through the choices in the first task.
To provide a more complete picture of subject search behavior, the evolution of
median transition frequencies for within-outcome and across-outcome transitions is
shown in Figure 17. On the left, the median frequency of within-outcome transitions
appears relatively flat in the hypothetical setting and slightly decreasing in the real
setting. In the graph on the right, the median frequency of across-outcome transitions
clearly decreases in both settings. In fact, the graph on the right shows that the
primary source of the decrease in total transitions shown in Figure 14 is subjects’
make fewer across-outcome transitions as they progress through the task.
FIGURE 17. Median transition frequency accounted for by the specified type of transition
type in real and hypothetical setting. Position number indicates the order in which the
choice was made.
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One way to interpret this evolution of search behavior is that subjects optimized
or streamlined their search behavior by reducing within-gamble exploration. In other
words, they minimized across-outcome transitions as they became more familiar with
these decisions, perhaps because such transitions do not improve the quality of the
decision if they are using an expected utility criterion.
The second task shows that search strategies do not change significantly as
subjects progressed through the choices in the second task. In other words, in the
second task, information acquisition behavior looks very similar whether a subject
was completing the first choice, the second choice, and so forth. This suggests that
the optimizing occurs during the first task and any gains in decision-making efficiency
carry over into the second task, which is reasonable.
Hypothetical versus Real
Figures 14 through 17 in the previous section suggest no significant differences
in how subjects acquired information across settings. In the brief analysis to follow,
I focus on percentages because there are information acquisition differences across
real and hypothetical settings in the second task in terms of the absolute number of
transitions. Specifically, the median transition frequency is eleven in the real setting
and nine in the hypothetical setting in the second task (Wilcoxon p-value = 0.076).
14. Within-gamble transitions account for well over eighty percent of total
transitions in both settings, and in both tasks. The third column shows that a test
of equal means fails to reject the null hypothesis that these percentages are equal
for both the first task and the second task, even though there are differences in the
absolute numbers of transitions across settings in the second task.
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TABLE 14. Within-Gamble Transitions
Percentage of total transitions that occur within the same
gamble. P-values shown for t-test of equal means.
Real Hypothetical t-test
First Task 0.838 0.843 0.317
Hypothetical Real
Second Task 0.833 0.831 0.659
The results are similar for the percentage of within-outcome transitions. Table
15 shows that at least forty percent of transitions can be classified as within-outcome
transitions in all four treatments. However, a test of equal means rejects the null
hypothesis that the percentages are equal in the second task at the nine percent level.
Despite this result, the practical importance of a two percentage point difference in
this context is unclear.
TABLE 15. Within-Outcome Transitions
Percentage of total transitions that occur between the
probability and payoff of the same potential outcome. P-
values shown for t-test of equal means.
Real Hypothetical t-test
First Task 0.410 0.400 0.366
Hypothetical Real
Second Task 0.458 0.437 0.088
The results are nearly identical in the choice phase for within-gamble and within-
outcome transitions. The mean percentage of within-gamble transitions in the choice
phase is at least 76 percent in all four treatments (the median percentages are well
over eighty percent), and tests of equal means across settings fail to reject the null of
hypothesis in both tasks (p > 0.161). Within-outcomes transitions account for more
than forty percent of total transitions in each treatment in the choice phase as well
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(i.e., for all choices after all eight cells have been viewed at least once). Again, the
null hypothesis of equal means across settings is not rejected (p > 0.491).
Conclusion
Individual decision makers often violate the maintained hypotheses of expected
utility theory (EUT) in systematic ways when making choices involving uncertainty.
In addition to the systematic violations, some argue that the complexity of many
decisions makes it too costly, or even impossible, for humans to compute expected
values. The response to this criticism has been that individuals may not compute
expected value, but they behave “as if” they do.
Despite the importance of questions about how individuals process information
while making decisions under uncertainty, there have been few attempts to actually
observe whether individuals acquire information in a pattern consistent with expected
utility theory. Three recent studies that have examined choice behavior with this
question in mind and have found conflicting evidence (Johnson et al., 2008; Arieli
et al., 2011; Glo¨ckner and Herbold, 2011). In contrast to these studies, which use
only hypothetical choices, I examine information acquisition using gambles with both
real and hypothetical payoffs. I also observe information acquisition behavior in the
context of a commonly used risk preference elicitation method, the Holt and Laury
multiple-price list. Finally, I avoid a framing effect that may have biased the results
of Johnson et al. (2008) toward finding information acquisition behavior consistent
with expected utility theory.
The results in this study suggest that subjects acquire information consistent
with expected utility theory (or with some other integration model, such as prospect
theory). Moreover, they tend to acquire information in sequences consistent with
expected utility in both the reading and the choice phase of the search process, and
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they do not acquire information in a manner consistent with the application of a
heuristic. These results are consistent with Johnson et al. (2008) and Arieli et al.
(2011), which found a similarly large percentage of information acquisition to be
consistent with the calculation of expected utility.
The evolution of search behavior as subjects progress through their choices further
supports the hypothesis that individuals integrate corresponding probabilities and
payoffs when making choices in this context. As subjects progressed through the
experiment, they slightly modified their search strategies in a manner consistent with
someone computing expected utility. In particular, the percentage of transitions
that are most consistent with an integrative search increased. Additionally, subjects
reduced the total number of transitions (which means less overall searching). This
behavior implies that subjects optimized their searches as they progressed through
the set of choices, even though there was no time constraint.
The use of both real and hypothetical payoffs enabled a comparison of search
behavior in both real and hypothetical settings, and subjects do not appear to acquire
information differently in real and hypothetical settings while completing the first
task. This result is significant because it suggests that, on average, individuals do
not use one type of decision making process when making hypothetical choices and
a fundamentally different type of decision making process when making real choices.
This result is consistent with the recent findings of Kang et al. (2011) that common
areas of the brain are activated when individuals make real and hypothetical purchase
decisions in a consumer goods context.
Finally, it is worth reiterating that this study observed information acquisition
behavior in the context of a standard risk preference elicitation method that assumes
individuals are making decisions in accordance with expected utility. The choices
that subjects encountered in this study are designed in such a way that subjects can
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compute expected value, but are sufficiently difficult in terms of the computational
effort required that subjects could choose to adopt a decision making heuristic instead.
However, the evidence presented here strongly suggests that subjects do not only make
choices “as if” they are computing expected utilities, it appears that they are actually
computing expected utilities.
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CHAPTER IV
BIAS AND BRAINS: ARE INDIVIDUALS WITH HIGHER COGNITIVE ABILITY
TREATING HYPOTHETICAL CHOICES AS PUZZLES?
Reliable estimates of risk preferences are frequently required to make appropriate
evaluations of the welfare implications of many policy changes. It is often necessary,
however, for risk preferences to be measured using hypothetical choices. For example,
many environmental policy changes effect the allocation of non-market goods, or goods
that will actually be provided at some time in the far distant future (e.g., reducing
the magnitude of the increase average temperatures, emissions reductions).
There is some evidence, however, to suggest that individuals may respond
differently to hypothetical choices involving risk than they do in similar real-choice
contexts. In an influential experiment designed to evaluate objections to laboratory-
based estimates of risk aversion, Holt and Laury (2002) demonstrate that, on average,
individuals tend to make choices that imply that they are more tolerant of risk in
a hypothetical setting than in a real setting. The Holt and Laury study also finds
that this “hypothetical bias” worsens as the size of the stakes increases. Several other
studies, including Holt and Laury (2005), also find evidence of hypothetical bias in
risk preferences (Battalio et al., 1990; Harrison, 2006).
However, some studies find no significant difference in average risk attitudes
across hypothetical and real contexts (see for example Beattie and Loomes (1997);
Camerer (1995); Camerer and Hogarth (1999), and Kuhberger et al. (2002)). For
instance, the results presented in Chapter II provide no indication of hypothetical bias
in average risk preferences for the sample used in this study. Furthermore, Chapters
II and III taken together suggest that there is no evidence that individuals acquire
information differently in hypothetical settings as opposed to real settings.
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In this chapter, I estimate individual risk preferences using richer models that
incorporate individual controls for cognitive ability and information acquisition. More
importantly, I allow for the interaction between these individual characteristics and
hypothetical settings, which enables the exploration of how individual characteristics
are related to risk preferences in different ways across real and hypothetical setting.
This is the first study to compare whether the relationship between cognitive
ability and risk aversion differs across real and hypothetical choice settings. Several
studies document a tendency for higher cognitive ability to be associated with lower
risk aversion (Frederick, 2005; Benjamin et al., 2006; Oechssler et al., 2009; Dohmen
et al., 2010; Campitelli and Labollita, 2010), but these studies use either hypothetical
choices or small expected payoffs.1 I use relative large payoffs—ranging from $1.90
to $81.00—and every subject makes choices that have real payoffs, as well as choices
that are hypothetical. Moreover, both options from which a subject chooses are
characterized by risk, in contrast to previous studies that ask subjects to choose
between a risky option and a sure option.2
Significantly, allowing for risk preferences to vary by cognitive ability across
settings reveals that cognitive ability is inversely related to risk aversion when the
choices are hypothetical, but it is unrelated to risk aversion when the choices are
real. This result implies that apparent differences in average risk preferences across
settings in previous studies could have been the result of a sample with higher cognitive
ability. For instance, the most influential study of risk preferences across settings
1Dohmen et al. (2010) do use a relatively large potential payoff in their study. They ask subjects
to choose between a sure option and a gamble, for which the potential payoffs are 0 euros and 300
euros and each potential outcome had a fifty percent probability of realization. However, only one in
seven subjects was actually paid, thereby reducing the expected payoffs substantially. Oechssler et
al. (2009) use real payoffs with a 75 percent probability of 20 euros, but only one in one hundred
subjects was actually paid.
2Benjamin et al. (2006) is the exception here. They ask subjects to choose between two gambles
in one trial, but they use small stakes (i.e., no more than $1.60).
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used a sample in which half of the subjects were undergraduates, one-third were MBA
students, and 17 percent were faculty members (Holt and Laury, 2002). A general
population sample might have produced different results.
This interaction between cognitive ability and setting signifies that the issue of
hypothetical bias is more nuanced than simply comparing mean behavior across settings.
It also provides a potential explanation for hypothetical bias in risk preferences. Such
behavior is consistent with the hypothesis put forth by Schkade and Payne (1994) that
subjects approach hypothetical choices presented to them in a contingent valuation
survey as “puzzles” that they must solve. If subjects are, indeed, “constructing”
solutions to the hypothetical choices about risk preferences, then differences in cognitive
ability could easily generate systematic differences in their responses to questions
about risk attitudes. In particular, it appears as if those with a greater ability to
“think slow,” in the language of Kahneman (2011), attempt to “solve” the hypothetical
choices and respond in accordance with risk neutrality.
Summary of Experiment
This section briefly summarizes some key features of the experiment and discusses
the measurement of cognitive ability. A complete exposition of the details of the
experiment can be found in Chapter 2.
Subject risk preferences were measured using the Holt and Laury Multiple Price
List (MPL) format (see Holt and Laury, 2002). The MPL presents subjects with ten
choices. Each choice has two gambles and subjects are asked to indicate which gamble
they prefer for each two-alternative choice. Given a subject’s choices over the entire
choice set, inferences can be made about her risk preferences.
In this experiment, all subjects completed the MPL in both real and hypothetical
settings. Half of the subjects were randomly selected to receive the real-payoff
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treatment in the first task, which meant that one choice from the set of ten included
in the MPL would be randomly selected for payment once the subject had completed
all ten choices. The other half completed the hypothetical choices in the first task.
This means they made similar choices but they did not receive a payoff for any of
their choices. In the second task, each subject completed the choices under whichever
treatment they had not yet completed.
Once subjects completed the choice tasks and their payoffs were revealed, they
were asked to complete a test that measured both numeracy and cognitive ability.
Numeracy tests are designed to measure an individual’s ability to understand and
manipulate numeric and probabilistic information. The computational complexity of
our tasks, along with the impact that numeracy could have on information acquisition
behavior, made it prudent for us to elicit such a measure of numeracy. I adapted an
eight-item test developed by Weller et al. (2011) that includes two of the three items
in the cognitive reflective test (CRT) introduced by Frederick (2005). The third item
from Frederick’s CRT is included in the test as well, so I have two separate measures
of ability: a numeracy score that measures a subject’s numeracy, and a CRT score
that measures a subject’s cognitive ability.3
The CRT was designed to evaluate an individual’s “System 2” cognitive processes
— the ability to solve problems that require “effort, motivation, concentration, and
the execution of learned rules” (Frederick (2005), pp. 26). In contrast, “System 1”
processes are spontaneous and do not require significant effort.4 Kahneman (2011)
highlights that, although some problems can easily be handled with System 1 (“Fast”)
processes, more difficult problems require the use of System 2 (“Slow”) processes.
Performance on the CRT, along with other measures of cognitive ability, has been
3The complete test is included in Appendix A.
4See Stanovich and West (2000) for a discussion of System 1 and System 2.
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shown to be predictive of risk preferences in previous studies (Frederick (2005);
Benjamin et al. (2006); Oechssler et al. (2009); Dohmen et al. (2010), and Campitelli
and Labollita (2010)). However, these studies use hypothetical choices or stakes with
relatively small expected values. In contrast, I use both relatively large stakes and I
collect choice information from both hypothetical and real settings for each subject.
The final section of the experiment was a debriefing questionnaire that inquired
whether subjects had been distracted during the experiment, whether they were
liquidity constrained, the income level of their household, their education level and
educational aspirations, the extent of their math and probability training, their
academic major, and their gender. Table 2 provides selected summary statistics based
on subjects’ responses to this questionnaire.5
Twenty-seven experimental sessions were conducted during March and April
of 2011. A total of 98 people, recruited primarily from undergraduate chemistry,
economics, and environmental studies courses at the University of Oregon, participated
in the experiment. Subjects earned an average total payoff of $52.68, with a maximum
of $86.00 and a minimum of $6.90. Nearly all subjects finished within 40 minutes.
After dropping one subject because she did not unmask a single attribute in seven
of the ten real choices, the sample includes a total of 97 subjects. Forty-eight subjects
completed the real choices in the first task; the remaining forty-nine completed the
hypothetical choices first. Based on two-sided t-tests, if the sample is partitioned by
whether a subject completed the real or hypothetical choices first, the samples are not
statistically different on dimensions commonly found to be related to risk attitudes.6
5The complete set of summary statistics is included in Appendix A. Where appropriate, some
response categories are combined into a single category.
6See Table A.1 in Appendix A.
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Approximately forty percent of the sample is female. Subjects answered 4.49
questions correctly, on average, on the six-item numeracy test. The average number of
correct answers on the three-item CRT is 1.27, which is comparable to the 1.24 average
score reported in Frederick (2005). The two scores have of correlation coefficient of
0.397. Males tended to score higher on both the numeracy test and the CRT, but not
to a statistically different degree (p-value > 0.6044). Only five subjects in the entire
sample indicated that they were “distracted at all during this experiment.” More than
half of the subjects have completed a course in which at least two weeks were spent
on probability and statistics. Finally, unlike many experiments that use primarily
economics and psychology majors, our sample is more than one-fifth science majors,
nearly one-fifth environmental studies/science majors, and another one-fifth business
majors.
Risk Aversion and Cognitive Ability
In Chapter II, I show that I do not find differences in implied risk preferences
between real and hypothetical settings. Similar to previous studies that have used the
MPL to estimate risk preferences, however, I do find that subjects are risk averse on
average.
As noted in the introduction, there are several studies that have examined the
relationship between cognitive ability and risk aversion. Those studies have generally
found that greater cognitive ability is associated with less risk aversion. However, all
of these studies use either hypothetical payoffs, relatively small payoffs, or a random
lottery mechanism, which reduces the expected payoff and introduces the potential
that a subject may not be paid for any of his choices.
Of particular interest here is Frederick (2005), which classified individuals as
either low-CRT or high-CRT depending on the number of correct responses on the
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CRT. Individuals with zero or one correct answers are classified as low-CRT, while
those who answered correctly for two or three questions are classified as high-CRT.
Using hypothetical choices, Frederick (2005) finds that high-CRT individuals tend to
indicate that they are more tolerant of risk.
If I limit the sample to the hypothetical choices and compare the mean number
of safe choices of low-CRT individuals to the mean of high-CRT individuals, I find
a similar result. In particular, high-CRT subjects made 5.5 total safe choices, while
low-CRT subjects made 6.6 safe choices. The difference in means between the two
groups is statistically significant (p-value=0.0484).
Figure 18 shows the average number of safe choices made by low-CRT and high-
CRT individuals in both the real setting and the hypothetical setting in the first
task. When making choices with real payoffs, it appears that individuals with greater
cognitive ability make slightly more safe choices than those with lower cognitive ability.
Yet, when the choices are made in a hypothetical setting, those with greater cognitive
ability make statistically fewer safe choices than they do in the real setting.
To explore how individual characteristics potentially interact with the hypothetical
setting, I obtain estimates of the risk preference parameter employing maximum
likelihood methods.7 Utility is assumed to be described by the standard constant
relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function, u(w) = w(1−r)(1−r) where w is the gamble
payoff. Under expected utility theory, subjects are assumed to make an expected
utility calculation of the form:
EUg = ph × U(wh|r) + pl × U(wl|r) (4.1)
7Harrison and Rutstro¨m (2008) provides an invaluable overview of maximum likelihood methods
to estimate risk preferences as well as guidelines for programming the models.
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FIGURE 18. Total Safe Choices in the First Task by Cognitive Ability
Classification (CRT Low=0 or 1 correct answers, CRT High=2 or 3
correct answers)
for each gamble g, where the probability of the high outcome h is denoted ph and the
probability of the low outcome is pl.
If the safe gamble is denoted as EUS and the risky gamble as EUR, a latent index
can be specified, based on subject preferences, that allows for deviations from the
deterministic choice specified by the expected utility calculation:
∇EU = EUS − EUR
µ
(4.2)
Under this specification, commonly referred to as the Fechner error specification,
the parameter µ can be interpreted as noise, and as this noise parameter increases
the latent index becomes less sensitive to differences in the expected utilities of the
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gambles and the choices are characterized by more randomness (Hey and Orme, 1994).8
The index in (4.2) forms the basis of a conditional likelihood function that is linked
to choices using either a normal or logistic cumulative distribution function. The
log-likelihood function can be denoted L = ∑i l(r, µ|Ci, Xi), where Ci denotes subjects’
choices and Xi denotes individual characteristics. This log-likelihood is maximized
with respect to unknown parameters r and µ.
Table 16 presents the resulting estimates of the coefficient of relative risk aversion,
r, and the noise parameter, µ, where each parameter is allowed to be a function of the
real or hypothetical setting, gender, the CRT score and the numeracy score separately,
and whether the subject opened sufficient cells to compute expected value for all
ten choices.9 Specification (1) in Table 16 includes an indicator for the hypothetical
setting and controls for individual characteristics. The results for these simple linear-
in-variables indexes for the systematically varying parameters r and µ are shown
in the first three columns of the table. The coefficient on the indicator variable for
hypothetical setting is small and statistically insignificant, suggesting that there is no
simple additively separable form of hypothetical bias in either of these two parameters.
Consistent with the reviews by Eckel and Grossman (2008) and Croson and
Gneezy (2009), the coefficient on the female indicator variable indicates that females
are more risk averse at a statistically significant level. The insignificant coefficient
on the hypothetical setting indicator variable in the expression for µ in Specification
(1) in Table 3 also suggests that there is not additional noise in the hypothetical
setting relative to the real setting. The breadth of subjects’ acquired information is,
8I also explored a Luce error specification, ∇EU = EU
1
µ
S
EU
1
µ
S
+EU
1
µ
R
, but the preferred specification
fails to converge. However, for specifications that did converge, the results were not substantively
different from the results of comparable specifications using a Fechner error structure. The results
reported here are robust to the choice of either normal or logistic cumulative distribution function.
9Attempts to include the indicator variable for the completion of a statistics or probability course
resulted in convergence problems, so this regressor is not included in our model.
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unsurprisingly, related to the level of noise: subjects who took the opportunity to
acquire EV-sufficient information for all ten choices made less noisy choices.
TABLE 16. Estimates of risk parameter “r” and noise parameter “µ.” CRRA utility
function, Fechner error specification. First task only.
Specification (1) Specification (2)
No Interaction Terms With Interaction Terms
VARIABLES Estimate Std. Err.† p-value Estimate Std. Err.† p-value
r
1(Hypot) 0.021 0.086 0.807 -0.088 0.399 0.825
1(Female) 0.197** 0.088 0.025 0.296*** 0.108 0.006
1(Female)×1(Hypot) -0.039 0.156 0.804
CRT Score 0.003 0.046 0.952 0.089 0.058 0.122
CRT×1(Hypot) -0.192** 0.089 0.031
Numeracy Score -0.073 0.046 0.111 -0.113 0.071 0.112
Numeracy×1(Hypot) 0.093 0.080 0.249
1(EV-sufficient All Choices) 0.098 0.101 0.335 0.186 0.131 0.156
1(EV-sufficient All)×1(Hypot) -0.138 0.190 0.469
Constant 0.816*** 0.208 0.000 0.813** 0.321 0.011
µ
1(Hypot) 0.034 0.559 0.952 0.739 2.199 0.737
1(Female) -0.532 0.450 0.236 -0.941** 0.398 0.018
1(Female)×1(Hypot) -0.408 0.749 0.586
CRT Score 0.056 0.232 0.810 -0.475* 0.260 0.068
CRT×1(Hypot) 1.448*** 0.501 0.004
Numeracy Score 0.126 0.214 0.557 0.257 0.207 0.215
Numeracy Score×1(Hypot) -0.628** 0.308 0.042
1(EV-sufficient All Choices) -1.770* 0.917 0.054 -2.378* 1.396 0.088
1(EV-sufficient All)×1(Hypot) 0.973 1.731 0.574
Constant 2.744** 1.173 0.019 3.360*** 1.237 0.007
Observations 970 970
LogL -374.4 -367.0
Notes: † Standard error estimates clustered on subject. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
In Specification (2) in Table 16, by including interaction terms between the
hypothetical setting indicator and each of the individual characteristics, I test whether
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there are differences across settings in the incremental effects on r and µ of each of
our individual controls. Here, again, we find that females are more risk averse at a
statistically significant level.
The most important finding from this experiment, however, is that the coefficient
on the interaction between the CRT score and the hypothetical setting indicator is
statistically significant. It suggests that subjects with higher cognitive ability are less
risk averse in the hypothetical setting than those who have lower cognitive ability. A
higher CRT score is apparently not related to risk aversion in the real setting, however.
Figure 19 plots the predicted coefficient of relative risk aversion against CRT score in
the real and the hypothetical settings.
FIGURE 19. Real versus Hypothetical: Estimated Relative Risk
Aversion with CRRA Utility and Fechner Noise by CRT Score, First
Task
The difference in the slopes between the two graphs in Figure 19 is striking.
Whereas the estimated coefficients of relative risk aversion are nearly identical for
subjects with low and high cognitive ability in the real setting, there is a dramatic
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difference in estimated risk aversion between subjects with low and high cognitive
ability in the hypothetical setting.
Specification (2) in Table 16 also suggests that the estimated noise parameter is
related to cognitive ability in an interesting way. Higher cognitive ability is associated
with less noise in the real choices, but with more noise in the hypothetical choices.
One possible explanation for the differential in noise for higher cognitive ability across
settings may be that subjects are more likely to focus and to try to make “accurate”
choices when the stakes are real. This is only speculation, of course, and this issue is
worthy of further study.
Discussion of Risk Aversion Results
Given the additional effort required for the choices in this experiment relative to
the choices in an experiment that used the conventional MPL, I believed my design
would be more likely to detect hypothetical bias. There is no evidence of a hypothetical
bias in average risk preferences. However, I do find that cognitive ability, as measured
by the CRT test, is related to risk aversion for hypothetical choices but not for real
choices.
The main implication of this finding is that apparent hypothetical bias in average
risk attitudes in a between-subjects comparison may be the result of omitted variable
bias. In particular, a study that used a sample of high cognitive ability individuals
would tend to find hypothetical bias in average risk preferences.
Why is the relationship between cognitive ability and risk aversion limited
to hypothetical choices? One possible explanation is that some individuals treat
hypothetical choices as “puzzles.” In a verbal-protocol process-tracing study of how
subjects arrived at values to hypothetical choices eliciting willingness to pay for an
environmental good, Schkade and Payne (1994) conclude that individuals “constructed”
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responses to the hypothetical choices presented to them in contingent valuation (CV)
studies. As Green et al. (1998) put it, “subjects often treat CV questions as puzzles
to which they must ‘construct’ a solution.”10 Similarly, Chilton and Hutchinson (2003)
find evidence that some subjects appear to “construct” their responses to questions
that elicit their hypothetical willingness to pay.
Although the studies mentioned above explore willingness to pay and not risk
preferences, if subjects view hypothetical choices in general as puzzles to be solved,
then it is entirely possible that “solutions” will differ by cognitive ability. The
mechanism could work in at least two ways. One possibility is that all subjects view
the hypothetical choices as puzzles, but only high cognitive ability individuals are able
or inclined to “solve” the puzzle. Those with higher cognitive ability will determine
that “the solution” is risk neutrality and will make their choices accordingly; those
with low cognitive ability cannot solve the puzzle so their choices reflect their actual
preferences.
It is also possible that the hypothetical contexts triggers a “problem-solving
switch” in high cognitive ability individuals only. Toplak et al. (2011) suggests that
those who score higher on the CRT have higher cognitive ability, and also differ in
their thinking disposition. The study finds that high-CRT subjects also score higher
on measures of open-minded thinking (more open-minded), consideration of future
consequences (more considerate), and superstitious thinking (less superstitious). Thus,
it is also possible that only high-cognitive-ability individuals even recognize that there
is a puzzle to be solved.
Whether some individuals, or all individuals, treat hypothetical choices about risk
preferences as puzzles deserves additional study. Whatever the particular mechanism
10In the study, subjects were asked about their willingness to pay for nets to cover oil ponds to
keep migratory birds from drowning in the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez oil spill. The authors used
a verbal protocol method to track how subjects arrived at their responses.
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at work, the interaction between cognitive ability and setting indicates that it is
important for future studies comparing risk preferences across hypothetical and real
settings to control for cognitive ability. Moreover, if cognitive ability is the source
of hypothetical bias in risk preferences, it is also possible that it can be measured
routinely and used to calibrate responses to hypothetical choices about risk.
Discussion and Conclusion
I conducted an experiment to test whether differences in estimated risk preferences
across real and hypothetical settings are associated with differences in either
information acquisition behavior or cognitive ability. Although the potential payoffs
in this experiment were relatively large and the research design increased the amount
of subject effort required in the tasks, there is no evidence of “hypothetical bias” in
average risk preferences in this sample.
Notably, however, I find that risk aversion is inversely related to cognitive ability
when the choices are hypothetical, but is unrelated to cognitive ability when the choices
are real. This relationship hints at a potential explanation for hypothetical bias in
average risk preferences detected in some previous studies (and represents a possible
source for the conflicting prior evidence concerning this tendency). Specifically, if a
study uses a sample of subjects with higher average cognitive ability, then a between-
subject comparison would be more likely to indicate that there is hypothetical bias in
average behavior.
This new evidence that risk preferences are related to cognitive ability in
hypothetical settings is consistent with the hypothesis that some, or all, subjects
treat hypothetical choices as puzzles to which they must construct a solution. If all
subjects are in fact treating hypothetical choices as puzzles, it is plausible that the
solutions will differ by cognitive ability because subjects with higher cognitive ability
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can “solve” the puzzle. It is also possible that only the high-cognitive-ability subjects
treat hypothetical choices as puzzles because they recognize that there is a puzzle to
be solved.
The interaction between cognitive ability and real versus hypothetical settings
poses both a challenge and an opportunity for the use of hypothetical choices to study
risk preferences. It poses a challenge because it is consistent with the hypothesis
that at least some subjects treat hypothetical choices as puzzles to be solved, which
confounds the measurement of risk preferences. It also presents an opportunity because
if the source of hypothetical bias is identified then it is possible to control for it and
responses can be appropriately calibrated.
Hypothetical scenarios are extremely valuable because they allow economists
to explore questions about risk preferences that would be prohibitively costly or
impractical with real consequences. In some cases, the only way to proceed with
research is to use hypothetical choice scenarios. Hypothetical bias, however, remains
an issue. The evidence in this study provides a possible explanation for hypothetical
bias in risk preferences. This issue deserves further study because if the actual source
of bias can be identified, then perhaps it can be better mitigated.
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APPENDIX A
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
Script of Instructions Read Aloud
Thank you for participating in this experiment. Your participation will allow us
to explore questions economists have about individual decision making.
In this experiment, you will be asked to make some choices. There are no
right or wrong choices. Additionally, although there are other people simultaneously
completing the experiment, you are not competing against anyone.
After you have made all of your choices, your payoff will be displayed on the
computer. Please stop at this page and raise your hand to let us know that you are at
your “payoff page” and we will verify your payoff and prepare your payment.
Note that there are some additional questions after the payoff page that we ask
that you also complete.
You will be paid in cash today before you leave. You will also be paid a $5
show-up fee. If you decide to leave early, you may do so. If you do leave early, you
will be allowed to keep the $5 show-up payment, but you will forfeit any experimental
earnings.
We understand that you may have questions, but it is important that we maintain
the integrity of the experiment by minimizing talking and other disruptions. If you
have a question before you begin making your choices, please write it down on the
card next to your computer and raise your hand. We will then check to see if it is a
question that we can answer.
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Finally, we ask that you do not discuss this experiment with anyone who may
also participate in this experiment so that we can maintain the integrity of our results.
Thank you.
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Numeracy and Cognitive Ability Test
Please answer the following questions to the best of your ability.
1. Imagine that we roll a fair, six-sided die 1,000 times. (That would mean that
we roll one die from a pair of dice.) Out of 1,000 rolls, how many times do you
think the die would come up as an even number?
2. In the BIG BUCKS LOTTERY, the chances of winning a $10.00 prize are 1%.
What is your best guess about how many people would win a $10.00 prize if
1,000 people each buy a single ticket from BIG BUCKS?
3. In the ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES, the chance of winning a car is 1
in 1,000. What percent of tickets of ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES
win a car?
4. If the chance of getting a disease is 10%, how many people would be expected
to get the disease out of 1000 people:
5. If the chance of getting a disease is 20 out of 100, this would be the same as
having a % chance of getting the disease.
6. Suppose you have a close friend who has a lump in her breast and must have
a mammogram. Of 100 women like her, 10 of them actually have a malignant
tumor and 90 of them do not. Of the 10 women who actually have a tumor,
the mammogram indicates correctly that 9 of them have a tumor and indicates
incorrectly that 1 of them does not have a tumor. Of the 90 women who do not
have a tumor, the mammogram indicates correctly that 81 of them do not have
a tumor and indicates incorrectly that 9 of them do have a tumor. The table
below summarizes all of this information. Imagine that your friend tests positive
(as if she had a tumor), what is the likelihood that she actually has a tumor?
FIGURE A.1. Table provided for subjects
7. A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball.
How much does the ball cost? [CRT question]
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8. In a lake, there is a patch of lilypads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it
takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for
the patch to cover half of the lake? [CRT question]
9. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100
machines to make 100 widgets? [CRT question]
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TABLE A.1. Full Summary Statistics
Comparison of summary statistics across treatments. “Real First” indicates
subjects completed the real choices in the first task; “Hyp. First” indicates
subjects completed the hypothetical choices in the first task
Variables Real first Hyp. First p-value
N 48 49 –
Female .46 .35 .268
Numeracy Score 4.56 4.43 .545
CRT Score 1.42 1.12 .138
1(Distracted) .04 .06 .667
Stats/Prob. Course .58 .55 .751
Major
Economics .10 .10 .973
Environmental Science .21 .16 .573
Science .23 .22 .957
Business .21 .18 .763
Other .25 .33 .411
Educational attainment
1(H.S. or Some college) .85 .84 .815
1(2-yr or bachelor’s) .15 .16 .815
1(Years college ≤ 1) .44 .24 .046
1(Years college > 1) .56 .75 .046
Educational aspirations
1(2-yr, BA, or done) .44 .37 .486
1(MA or professional) .40 .43 .746
1(Doctoral) .17 .20 .640
Status
1(Student only) .69 .74 .613
1(Student & PT emp.) .21 .12 .259
1(Status: other) .10 .14 .568
Other Demographics
Dependent .73 .84 .202
Age 22.1 21.5 .409
Height: Males (inches) 69.8 71.1 .135
Height: Females (inches) 64.8 66.7 .104
Income category
1(<$10,000) .21 .27 .515
1($10,000-$74,999) .27 .22 .601
1(>$75,000) .40 .39 .936
1(Declined to answer) .13 .12 .970
Notes: One subject was dropped dropped from the analysis because she did not
unmask a single attribute in seven of her ten choices in the real task.
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APPENDIX B
EXAMPLE OF EXPERIMENT
This appendix includes screenshots of the experiment.
FIGURE B.1. Experiment, Introduction.
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FIGURE B.2. Experiment Tutorial, page 1 of 4. The first of four pages with instructions about
how the gambles will be presented. This page also includes a question to test a subject’s understanding. Subjects can
not continue unless they answer the question correctly.
FIGURE B.3. Experiment Tutorial, page 2 of 4. The second of four pages with instructions about
how the gambles will be presented. This page also includes a question to test a subject’s understanding. Subjects can
not continue unless they answer the question correctly.
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FIGURE B.4. Experiment Tutorial, page 3 of 4. The third of four pages with instructions about
how the gambles will be presented. This page also includes a question to test a subject’s understanding. Subjects can
not continue unless they answer the question correctly.
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FIGURE B.5. Experiment, 4 of 4 pages. The fourth of four pages with instructions about how
the gambles will be presented. This page includes two questions to test a subject’s understanding. Subjects cannot
continue until they answer all questions correctly.
FIGURE B.6. How to Indicate Preferred Choice. This page instructs subjects on how to indicate
their preference between the pair of gambles.
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FIGURE B.7. Experiment, Page 7. This page explains that there will be two sections in which they will
make choices.
FIGURE B.8. Example of Part A Instructions. Instructions for the choices in Part A. These
instructions differ by whether the subject was selected to complete real or hypothetical choices first. Subjects selected
to complete the real choices first saw the instructions shown in Figure B.15.
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FIGURE B.9. Explanation of Results, page 1 of 3. The first of three pages explaining how subjects’
payoffs will be determined. These differ depending on whether subjects completed real or hypothetical choices first.
FIGURE B.10. Explanation of Results, page 2 of 3. The second of three pages explaining
how subjects’ payoffs will be determined. These differ depending on whether subjects completed real or hypothetical
choices first.
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FIGURE B.11. Explanation of Results, page 3 of 3. The third of three pages explaining how
subjects’ payoffs will be determined. These differ depending on whether subjects completed real or hypothetical
choices first.
FIGURE B.12. Begin Part A Choices.
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FIGURE B.13. Example of Hypothetical Choice
FIGURE B.14. Transition Between Choice Sections
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FIGURE B.15. Example of Part B Instructions. Instructions for the choices in Part B. These
differ depending on whether subjects completed real or hypothetical choices first. Subjects selected to complete the
real choices first saw these instructions before making their choices in Part A.
FIGURE B.16. Example of Real Choice
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FIGURE B.17. Completion of Part B.
FIGURE B.18. Transition to Results.
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FIGURE B.19. Example of Hypothetical Task Results
FIGURE B.20. Example of Real Task Results
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FIGURE B.21. Numeracy Test Instructions.
FIGURE B.22. Numeracy Test, page 1 of 4. Questions 1 through 3 of the numeracy test.
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FIGURE B.23. Numeracy Test, page 2 of 4. Questions 4 through 5 of the numeracy test.
FIGURE B.24. Numeracy Test, page 3 of 4. Question 6 of the numeracy test.
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FIGURE B.25. Cognitive Reflective Test (CRT), page 4 of 4. Questions 7 through 9 of the
numeracy test.
FIGURE B.26. Debriefing Questionnaire, page 1 of 2. First page of debriefing questionnaire.
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FIGURE B.27. Debriefing Questionnaire, page 2 of 2. Second page of debriefing questionnaire.
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